

The Reporter

January 8, 1952 25c


UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

MAY 9 1952

PERIODICAL
READING ROOM

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Figures in the investigation of corruption in government: (above) Frank Nathan and Charles Oliphant; (below) T. Lamar Caudle and Abraham Teitelbaum







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THE REPORTER'S NOTES

Wanted: Neutrals

We should never lose sight of what happens in Korea, even when the news from there does not make big headlines. For in Korea the main problem of our foreign policy, our relations with the Communist nations, acquires a down-to-earth reality. There our armies have contained Communist aggression, and now at Panmunjom an experiment in coexistence is being conducted.

Of course, in Paris too, there are meetings between our delegates and the Communists. To oblige the President of the General Assembly, representatives of the three big western democracies spent several days talking disarmament with Mr. Vishinsky. But as far as we know, they were exposed to no greater hardship than that of looking at Mr. Vishinsky's face.

But Panmunjom is the real thing. In those badly heated tents, our representatives have been bargaining for weeks and months with the Communist delegates. Some progress has been made —at a snail's pace. The U.N. representatives have now agreed to drop the idea of entrusting the inspection behind both lines to joint U.N.-Communist teams when and if the armistice is ever signed. At Panmunjom we are no longer insisting on the right of unlimited inspection, and we have agreed to leave inspection to representatives of neutral powers.

Inspection is still talked about in very broad terms in Paris. Our representatives there still say that it has to be unlimited or virtually so. But limited or unlimited inspection, to be effective, must be accompanied by some guarantee of law enforcement. Police officers during the Prohibition Era certainly had the right of unlimited inspection of speakeasies, but this did not

do the Eighteenth Amendment any good.

It also appears that inspection in Korea may be carried out only at mutually accepted key points. If the negotiations proceed to a successful end, we will see whether this works.

In any case, the inspecting is to be done by neutrals. This confronts us with an unforeseen dilemma. On one hand, we do not care for nations which stay neutral and uncommitted while we are struggling to contain Communism. On the other, if the containment of Communism is going to result in some form of peace, we will need the kind offices of nations that have stayed neutral. They have to be nations of a certain type and size, not too big and not too small, nations with enough military background to have officers who know something about armaments, but not so strong that they can acquire the balance of power. Neither San Marino nor Germany could qualify.

The Accusation Courteous

Some sort of citation for diplomatic-circumlocution-of-the-year should go to Rear Admiral R. E. Libby, one of the U.N. truce delegates in Korea. When the Reds unblinkingly declared that they were caring for prisoners of war better than the Geneva Convention specified, he answered: "Your refusal to admit the International Red Cross [for an inspection of North Korean P.W. camps] feeds the fire of suspicion that your assertions are not entirely factual."

Con Man

Not long ago a member of *The Reporter's* staff received a long, involved letter from a man he had never heard of in Mexico City, who said that he

had been jailed for bankruptcy and that if our staff member would pay his fine he would put the latter in the way of an enormous sum of money he had cached long ago. Our man, being well informed, spotted this immediately as the hoary confidence game known as the "Spanish prisoner swindle." This racket, whose origins are lost in the sixteenth century, has been tried on so many Americans lately that it has come to the stern attention of the *New York Times*, whom we quote:

"As practiced on many gullible souls, the fraud calls for a letter to the victim from a supposed Spanish prisoner who writes that he has hidden assets up to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Sometimes a beautiful daughter is included among the assets. The proposition put to the victim is that he provide funds to effect the prisoner's release in return for a third or half of the assets. Over the years many impressionable persons have succumbed to the hoax."

Reading this, we were struck by a little political allegory. Suppose the "Spanish prisoner" were Generalissimo Francisco Franco and go on from there. The "gullible souls" he has asked to bail him out in return for some of his "hidden assets" are the taxpayers of the United States. In his case the "assets" are military rather than monetary. Like the confidence man, he is a prisoner only of his own tortuous machinations. Among the "impressionable persons" who have "succumbed to the hoax" we can think of two U. S. Senators named McCarran and Brewster and a prominent U. S. publisher named McCormick.

But there the parallel falls apart: Franco really does have a beautiful stepdaughter—Spain.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE ABACUS

To the Editor: I must object to the abacus on the first page of "The Brain Foundry," Christopher Gerould's article about the I.C.S. in your December 11 issue. The abacus is a precision tool, used as a calculating machine by more people than any other adding machine. They call them *sorotan* in Japan. The business schools there teach the use of them along with our mechanical calculators. We were told by a school for girls that long multiplication problems could be solved as quickly on the *sorotan* as on our type of machine. It is used in India, China, and Japan. Someone has said that the decimal system was developed from the abacus.

The point is, the artist who carelessly drew a sketch of an abacus for the I.C.S. article put only four beads below the divider on the thirteenth pin. They should all have five below the divider and two above. And he put thirteen rows whereas the standard abacus has nine.

One would think that illustrations for business institutions or tools would be accurately done.

BURTON E. DAVIS
Los Angeles

ON D. B. W.

To the Editor: Yours is an intelligent journal. Even when I cannot agree with some of your writers I must grant their sincerity and the logic of their arguments, although often they are based on completely false premises. But surely you are joking when you print something like "The Russians Aren't So Clever," by D. B. W. in your issue of December 11. The discussion is little more than a tirade; in parts it is even ludicrous. D. B. W. doesn't like the people he is writing about. Fine, but he is surely aware of the dangers of wishful thinking.

To begin with, the author states that "A nation's diplomatic action cannot be judged until a certain cycle of events is completed." This sounds impressive, but what does it mean? Nowhere is it indicated. Then the generalization: "The true Stalinist is not concerned with raising the economic status of the masses; his real interest is reaching a greater knowledge and a more triumphant verification of dialectical materialism." Very resounding and very dogmatic. Are we to accept this opinion as fact without the proof that is so conspicuously absent?

Then the incredible stew: the Maginot Line; the failure to fit in their (the Russians') pet scheme "not speaking very well for their intelligence"; the von Seydlitz manifesto, etc. . . . All quite puerile and with no relation to the argument.

What does D. B. W. wish to prove when he says that Russia's action in China is only

a feint? Is this an indication of the stupidity of Russian diplomacy? Entirely the opposite would seem to me true, and D. B. W. realizes it, for he says, in reference to the Russian principle of creating "disorder in the East only to strike indirectly at Europe and, as a final move, at America," that "Like all dialectical reasoning, this has some sound points, and it may even represent the best possible policy for Russia to follow today" (italics mine). After this conclusion the only person D. B. W. may convince is himself.

In the subsequent discussion the writer shows that he knows absolutely nothing of "dialectics." That the Russians muffed golden chances in various European countries doesn't mean a thing. That "the French and Italian people were inclined to swing toward the Left in the postwar period" is no sign that they were ready to accept Russian influence. And the Russians, above all, know this. No, the western European countries are serving their part, by Russian standards, in draining American production and financial power.

I don't believe that even its most enthusiastic proponent would claim that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a homogeneous structure. How can it be with the potential membership of Falangist Spain and Communist Yugoslavia? How real is rearmament in Italy and France? What are we to do with a West Germany which we could use as a military ally, but which is still a hotbed of Nazism? "Why act," the Russians may say, "when time works for us?"

I have just finished rereading D. B. W.'s article. I am quite sure that my politics professor would have flunked me for such a piece. "Intelligence" is not absolute but relative. If we maintain that so-and-so is not so clever, then we also believe that someone else is cleverer. This line of argument D. B. W. avoids very carefully.

COGITO
Drummond, Quebec

EUROPEAN UNION

To the Editor: Louis Duval's article, "Motives for European Union on Both Sides of the Ocean" (December 25 issue), presents a realistic picture of the national motives behind support of the international schemes of the Schuman Plan and a European army. I cannot help feeling, however, that the author overlooks the fact that there has been a theoretical argument for some form of limited European Union, based on functional organization.

This theory, expounded by Professor David Mitran in *A Working Peace System* (London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944), develops the thesis that international government should be co-

extensive with international activities. As he expressed it at various points in his book, international government "must care as much as possible for common needs that are evident, while presuming as little as possible upon a social unity which is still only latent and unrecognized. . . ."

Although Professor Mitran at that time thought that the functional approach was exemplified by the specialized agencies of the United Nations, what is happening in Europe today could be justified on the same grounds.

MARIE HOTTON
Springfield, Massachusetts

WE GOT LEFT

To the Editor: Which is Kurt Schumacher's good arm? Theodore H. White (in your December 11 issue) writes on page 11 that Schumacher lost his right arm, but then on page 16 speaks of the "good right arm." The sketch on page 15 shows Schumacher with a good left arm. White's not right, but how about the artist, Wright?

LOUIS TOPLOSKY
Perth Amboy, New Jersey
[White's wrong; Wright is right; left arm's right; right is gone; we're chagrined.—The Editors]

THE FENCE JUMPER

To the Editor: Since I had suggested an article on Harold Stassen, I was pleased to see William Shannon's piece in the November 13 issue. But I feel Shannon has missed the main point in the decline of Stassen: Stassen has few supporters because he has jumped so many fences that no one can trust a man who was once a Young Turk; the liberals cannot trust the man who helped Grundy in his unsuccessful effort to beat James Duff. Stassen's trouble is that he refuses to hold still.

DAVID HAPGOOD
New York City

DAMNING BY IMPLICATION

To the Editor: It seems to me you are doing just the thing one of your correspondents accused *Time-Life* of—damning by implication—in your article on Dean Johnson, October 30. I quote: ". . . have included congenial sessions with Stalin, Molotov, Tito, Paul Robeson, Henry Wallace, and William Howard Melish." You mean you *really* consider Henry Wallace, and even Paul Robeson for that matter, along with Stalin and Molotov?

It's really discouraging to find *The Reporter*, for which I have great respect, pulling stuff like this. I hope I don't have to put that "have" into the past tense.

K. H. BALD
San Francisco

The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS



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in this issue . . .

The Reporter's four studies in U. S. politics, 1952, include a look-ahead at some chickens coming home to roost; a report on the tradition and temperaments of two distinguished political brothers; a case-history of government control of a private industrial empire and what it means to the comparatively ill-paid Federal officials who do the job; and the story of a group working to sneak in a new constitutional amendment. . . . **H. A. DeWeerd** has responded to our request to evaluate with as much objectivity as is possible today the military achievements of General MacArthur. . . . **William H. Hessler** is a columnist for the Cincinnati *Enquirer*. . . . **Robert G. Lewis** writes for several Midwestern periodicals. . . . **Minna Post Peyser** is a free-lance writer doing graduate work at Columbia University. . . . **Peter J. Allen** is the pseudonym of a European journalist who has recently been traveling in Yugoslavia. . . . **Maurice J. Goldbloom** served until recently as Labor Information Officer of ECA in Greece. . . . **Ugo Stille** is American correspondent for the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan. . . . **John B. Spore** is associate editor of the *U.S. Army Combat Forces Journal*. . . . **J. K. Galbraith** is an economist on the faculty of Harvard University. . . . **Philip Burnham** is a contributing editor of *The Commonwealth*. . . . Cover by **Lewis Daniel**; inside cover photographs from Harris & Ewing; map from *The American Oxford Atlas*.

Politics—1952

THREE IS restlessness in the country, and bewilderment, and anger. For too long people have been reeling under disclosure after disclosure of corruption and scandal—in basketball, in police departments, in the Bureaus of Internal Revenue, or high up in government offices. All these cases involving fixes of one sort or another drive home the same conclusion: Too many Americans in a position of trust do not live up to it. Somehow each new evidence of corruption exacerbates our nearly uncontrollable fear of disloyalty. When our angry President called Judge Murphy to the White House, he, like the rest of us, must have sensed that corruption is disloyalty.

This is a very serious situation, for a democracy lives on trust. It presupposes a large measure of conformity to the laws—although it can bear a foreseeable margin of cheating and litigation. But the margin can never be too broad. In a democracy some of the most important laws are those which have sunk so deep into our consciousness that we become aware of them only when they are flagrantly violated. Widespread distrust of the men who hold positions of responsibility does greater damage to a democracy than seditious riots.

These revelations of wrongdoing have intensified the recurrent popular dislike for political machines. The people lately have been voting for an independent candidate whenever they have had the chance or for anybody brazen enough to adopt the magic word "independent." Sometimes, as in the last New York mayoralty election, this makes the people play a crude practical joke on themselves. But the trend is here, and the politicians either fear it or try to cash in on it.

Where the Disease Is Worse

It may not be much of a consolation, but certainly in other democratic nations, particularly in continental Europe, the peoples' distrust of their governments has been far more ravaging than it has over here. There the people know, from recent experi-

ence, what it means to be totally let down by their governments and to be submerged by defeat or inflation. Even now, the European political parties are so unresponsive, or irresponsible, that they have practically ignored the surging pressure for continental unification. In fact, there is only one political party on the continent of Europe that is completely international or supranational in its aims—but this is the party dedicated to the expansion of the Soviet empire. Each Communist Party pretends not only to be democratic but to defend the sovereign integrity of its nation against the encroachments of American "imperialism" and European federalism. The Communists pretend to be belligerently parochial—a cruel caricature of the national parochialism that is characteristic of the genuinely democratic parties.

The pettiness of party politics in Europe—plus the constant fear of Russia and the constant dependence on America—does not make for stable democracies. When a nation is not strong enough to control any of the forces that affect its life, political freedom turns out to be rather hollow. The great decisions are made somewhere else, by some other nation—Russia or the United States.

The maldistribution of power between our nation, which has so much, and our allies, who have so little, produces regrettable results on both sides of the ocean. We are still unaccustomed to our power and the freedom of action it gives us. Our allies are not easily reconciled to their weakness or to the futility of their freedom. The extraordinary thing here is that we too, in spite of our power or because we don't know how to use it, seem to have fallen victim to helplessness and disillusionment.

The Basic Facts

In 1952, the American people will decide what they want to accomplish during the four years of the next Presidency. These will be crowded years. The people's decisions are swayed partly by debates on programs, partly—and in normal election years to a far

greater extent—by all the devices showmanship can find to divert attention from the real issues. In 1952, there should be the greatest possible emphasis on issues—at least on the part of those politicians who are Americans first and Republicans or Democrats second. It is not easy for European politicians to be quite candid without exposing their own helplessness. The American people must get the facts about their power, its limitations, and its best use.

The first of these facts is that the era of the hit-and-run, once-and-for-all attempt to rescue the world or to put it on its feet—the era of lend-lease, UNRRA, and the Marshall Plan—is gone forever. Each of these efforts did a great amount of good and represented remarkable progress over the last; but each was far too costly and we know now that our nation is not wealthy enough to finance large-scale, repeated experiments in global reconstruction.

This leads to the second fact: That we must find the way to give assistance to our allies for a period of unlimited duration at a constantly decreasing cost. This demands great changes in our attitude and greater ones in theirs, for it is to our and even more to their interest to reduce their dependence on us and our intervention in their affairs. We will be far stronger when we have allies who stand beside us as actual and not only legal or conventional equals.

For we are now learning that while the supremacy of a tyrannical nation guarantees internal tyranny in its satellites, the supremacy of a free nation may endanger the free institutions of its allies. It would be different if we wanted to become an empire and to rule our part of the world with proconsuls or stooges. But we do not want to be an empire and we are not made to be one. We need a system of insurance and counter-insurance against the danger of becoming an empire. Our allies need a system of insurance and counter-insurance to become independent of us and unafraid of Russia. The two needs are complementary and are being satisfied by the same interlocking system. We know its several names: United Europe, British Commonwealth, Atlantic Alliance, Pan-American Union, United Nations. Nor is it too early to press for new alliances and unions in the Middle East and in Asia.

The third fact is that a major cause of international disturbance lies in the unpredictability of our foreign policy. This unpredictability, real or alleged, has frequently disheartened our allies and emboldened our enemies. We need to speak with one voice, to let the whole world know the basic aims of our diplomatic and strategic policy.

The last but not the least important fact is that in our world, or part of the world, corruption does not respect national or party boundaries. In fact,

the most infectious corruption is international in scope and, in our internal politics, bipartisan. Concretely, the favorite Congressional game of sponsoring pet nations or pet régimes must come to an end. We dislike exerting a constant influence on the internal business of other countries, and we cannot tolerate foreign interests meddling in American politics. This may seem far removed from the current Washington scandals, but the agents of corruption have a curious way of getting together, and a strange solidarity—something more tangible than “singular affinity”—can be found among people concerned with evading taxes, gambling, and adopting foreign governments.

If these facts are plainly brought to the people, the people will not fail to grasp them. The people talk about little else but war and peace, aside from corruption, and they must be told how peace can be made constructive by lightening the bonds among the Allies and how war, should the enemy bring it on us, can only be won the same way. In 1952, these facts and issues are of more immediate importance to the citizens than any measure affecting any particular group of interests—like farm support or social insurance. For what would be the use of any particular group benefit if war and inflation come?

Presidential Timber

The peculiar characteristic of this Presidential election is perhaps that while it will be run as one of our usual slugging matches, the nation will require a moratorium on a large measure of partisanship as soon as the new Administration is at work. The gravity of the international situation and the present uneasiness of the public make this imperative. To raise the moral tone of the nation, the mere replacement of the party in power or reshuffling of an existing Cabinet is not enough. Public opinion is determined to go to the heart of the whole matter, and corruption is not the monopoly of any one party.

The moratorium on partisanship does not need to be complete or to suspend the operation of our two-party system. But certainly if the next President is to exert the leadership on which the salvation of the free world depends, he will need the broadest possible bipartisan support in Congress and might have to run the country with a bipartisan Cabinet. Indeed, it may be added that regardless of the services any candidate might have rendered the nation, no one who cannot command this broad, bipartisan support can be the President the country needs.

This is not a nomination speech, and I do not think I have to mention again the name of the one person I consider suited to the job.

The Brothers Taft

Charles may think Bob's foreign-policy outlook limited, but Bob apparently believes that Charles's political career should be

WILLIAM H. HESSLER

BY NOW, every American who listens to radio or television must know the flat voice of Robert Alphonso Taft, the first serious contender to reveal formally that he wants to run for President in 1952. Not so many know the warmer voice of his younger brother, Charles Phelps Taft, who on November 9 announced his candidacy for the governorship of Ohio. But for those who do know him, Charles P. is much more of a chip off the old block—if one may so refer to President William Howard Taft. Charles carries on the temperate liberalism of a father who, in his day, successfully challenged a reactionary Ohio political machine. In his own right, Charles P. Taft is an authentic and highly articulate spokesman of liberalism and internationalism—in a party that needs a good deal more of both.

If various things come to pass, many Ohioans next autumn will vote simultaneously for a Taft for President and another Taft for governor. The Taft brothers are profoundly different, but it will not be altogether illogical to vote for both—granted the opportunity. To vote for Robert will be to ask for a turn to the Right in Washington, for which a case can be made. To vote for Charles P. will be to ask for a gentle change of course to the Left in the Ohio G.O.P., for which a case certainly can be made. Indeed, there is nowhere for Ohio Republicans to go but Left, unless they were to fill the governorship by recalling from the U.S. Senate John Bricker, William McKinley's current stand-in.

Robert Taft's declaration of his candidacy merely confirmed the obvious. But when Charles announced his, he startled many persons and also laid down a formidable challenge to one of

the most reactionary state organizations of which the Republican Party can boast. For Charles P. Taft is not only a man of liberal mind and international interests. He is not only an eminent Christian layman who thinks Christianity ought to permeate our public life. He also has been for twenty-seven years the most consistent and effective leader of the fusion movement in Cincinnati, the City Charter Committee.

This reform movement, which has made Cincinnati one of the best-governed large cities in the United States, is founded on the notion, heretical to Ohio G.O.P. leaders, that local government ought to be separated from national political parties. In Cincinnati, Democrats and independent Republicans joined to get rid of a sensationally corrupt city administration in 1924, and have managed to keep in power, except for a brief interval, ever since.

This has deprived the Hamilton County Republican machine of control in City Hall for most of the last quarter century. And what hurts worse, it has deprived it of virtually all patronage at City Hall for the *entire* quarter century, with no sign that a return to bossism and patronage will be tolerated in future.

To lead in such a fusion movement, as Charles Taft did, is the most cardinal of political sins; and various G.O.P. leaders in Ohio are whetting their stilettos for reprisal. But except in the case of Ed Schorr, boss of the Ohio Republican machine for twenty years, the urge for revenge already is waning. Schorr, no longer state chairman, continues as chief lobbyist at Columbus on a highly lucrative basis.

Thirty Years of Standing Pat

Actually, many Ohioans realize that their state is acutely in need of fresh and modern leadership. Ohio was a pioneer in social legislation and in governmental innovation under Governor James M. Cox. That was thirty years ago. Since then, the governors of the Buckeye State have ranged from honest reactionaries to deft charlatans; but none has ever been caught in the act of reform. In structure and method, Ohio's has become an antiquated government. In political philosophy, it reflects the era of Warren G. Harding. Conceivably, Charles P. Taft could do for Ohio what he and a few colleagues did for Cincinnati.

Fresh out of Yale Law School and full of good intentions, Charles Taft plunged into reform politics as soon as he hit Cincinnati. In 1926 he defeated Schorr in the primary for county prosecutor, and went on to win the election in a short-lived county-reform wave.



William Howard Taft



Charles P. Taft

The bitterness of early defeat may add a touch of gall to Schorr's more practical reasons for opposing Charles Taft's gubernatorial aspirations in 1952.

Taft's prospective opponent in the May primary, one Roscoe A. Walcutt, is an unspectacular state legislator, unmistakably a Schorr man and not inherently a formidable opponent. It is possible he will be replaced by a more personable and aggressive candidate before filing time, in February. Ray Bliss of Akron, the present state chairman, is conscientiously neutral—as is, officially, the G.O.P. state organization.

Up from the White House

Coloring the whole murky picture of Ohio Republicanism, however, is the anomalous relationship of the Taft brothers. It is compounded of a forced camaraderie and an ill-suppressed rivalry. The area of agreement between them is considerable. Both can be called middle-of-the-road Republicans—safely between John Bricker and Wayne Morse. But the area of disagreement, more manifest in recent years, is no less significant.

Charles's unpopularity with some of Ohio's G.O.P. bosses stems partly from his liberalism, but mostly from his insurgency against the regular party machine in Hamilton County. His divergence from his brother, on the other hand, is chiefly on foreign policy. Al-

though Charles isn't talking about it, one may be sure that his decision to go into big-time politics for himself grows directly from his disgust with Robert's neo-isolationism and tolerance of McCarthyism.

William Howard Taft's boys were distinctly unlike from their early years. Robert was a studious, solitary, self-sufficient youngster, Charles a happy extrovert. At the age of twelve, he met all comers at the White House with a ready smile and a quick tongue. Everything that has happened to the brothers since has widened the gaps between their personalities and between their political viewpoints.

If academic grades are a measure, the Tafts are both bright, and about equally so. Robert, the elder by eight years, was first in his class at Yale, Charles second in his. Robert was first in his law class at Harvard, Charles first in his at Yale. Charles probably has more sheer aptitude for absorbing facts and ideas. Robert worked industriously to lead his classes. Charles has a gift for grasping the contents of a page of print without reading it through; his grades nearly equaled his brother's, though he found time to play varsity football, to reform the fraternity system a bit, and (in law school) to coach the freshman football line.

The Tafts have a long family tradition of public service. (Their grandfather, Alphonso Taft, was Secretary of War in Grant's Cabinet, and Minister to Austria-Hungary and Russia. Their father rose from assistant county prosecutor to President and Chief Justice.) It was after law school, however, that the roads forked irrevocably for Robert and Charles. Both looked to public service. Robert chose party regularity and a good corporate law practice. Charles chose indignation, reform, and applied Christianity.

As the years passed, Robert emerged from a long apprenticeship in the state legislature a loyal follower of two deities—party regularity and corporate business. In the Senate, he has learned to smile with less effort and to talk with much greater fluency. His energy and talents have made him "Mr. Republican," front runner for the post he doubtless has coveted since he last lived in the White House as a youth. Robert has disciplined himself to make every word, every move, count in an ordered career.

Charles, the extrovert, has scattered his shots. During the depression, when cheap housing was acutely needed in Cincinnati, he built 276 low-cost houses, tried to make a profit of fifty dollars on each, and wound up about even. Robert's real-estate operations have been far more remunerative. Charles practiced enough law and made enough speeches around the country to earn a living—a problem in the best of times for a man with seven children. But he gave his main energies to municipal reform. In 1937 he entered the City Council, helping to hold for the Charter group that bloc of independent Republican votes it needed for survival. After a lengthy wartime interruption, he re-entered the City Council and headed the all-important Finance Committee while the Charterites had the majority for four years. In 1951, with the governorship in mind, he declined to seek re-election, and without his bid for independent Republican votes the Charterites yielded majority control once more to the regular Republican machine.

Religion to Relief . . .

Charles Taft's questing mind has probed into religion and its application to public affairs. He did not adopt his father's Unitarian faith but followed his mother's example and became an active Episcopalian. Moving into leadership here as elsewhere, in 1947 he be-



Robert A. Taft

came the first layman to serve as president of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ—just in time to rescue it from a damaging reputation of pinkness. He made it nearly as effectual a voice in domestic economic affairs as it had been in foreign policy.

Toward the end of the great depression, Charles was outraged by the high-handed, unsympathetic treatment of people on relief by the Carolina-bred Army officer then serving as City Manager of Cincinnati. Charles invited people on relief to come and see him for advice on how to get their rights at the city's welfare department. They arrived to his law office in such numbers that he rented special quarters near the main slum area, at his own expense. There he counseled the puzzled, browbeaten, and helpless victims of unemployment—fifteen thousand of them before the venture was over.

Charles was deeply interested in labor relations, and had both labor unions and corporations as law clients. As Federal mediator, he successfully settled the bloody Electric Auto-Lite strike in Toledo in 1934 and three years later headed the mediation board that cleared up the equally violent Little Steel strike. At gatherings of churchmen in America, England, and Switzerland, he has steadily preached a doctrine of Christian justice in industrial relations.

... to Red Lights

During the Second World War (he was in Field Artillery in the First), Charles filled the biggest gap in his preparation for high public office—administrative experience. In 1941 he was called by the Secretaries of War and Navy (both Republicans) to organize recreational facilities for military camps, a job that grew into the far bigger one of supplying community services—sewers, water lines, schools, hospitals, and housing—near the perimeters of the camps. This nondrinking, nonsmoking Taft also closed down and kept closed no fewer than seven hundred red-light districts while the Army of the United States was building.

From early 1944 until the war ended, Charles was in the State Department as director of the office of Wartime Economic Affairs. It was a job in which he made extraordinarily good use of two assets—an amazingly wide ac-



William McKinley

quaintance with important people throughout the United States, and an innate quickness of mind that senses the contours of a problem easily and finds improvisations readily.

As loyal and admiring friends have noted with regret at times, Charles spread himself pretty thin for some years, chiefly because he never likes to say "No" when asked to make a speech or serve on a committee. Also, he has a restless curiosity about many things. Has this made him a dilettante? Some say so. But they did not watch him take over the jumbled finances of the city of Cincinnati four years ago, lay out an ordered public-improvements plan, and launch a massive master plan for the community—and still keep the city out of the red. That was the performance of a skilled, hard-driving public servant.

In a sense, Charles Taft is a victim of his own superior mental capacity. He offends a good many people by appearing uninterested in what they have to say to him. During a conversation he habitually reads a magazine and, like as not, eats an apple. This troubles people. But afterwards, he knows precisely what he has read and precisely what his caller has said. And he has enjoyed the apple.

In one council campaign, Charles was caught up by his irrepressible penchant for riding off in all directions at once. He was about to become president of the Council of Churches. There

were rumors (well founded) that he had been offered an important Federal post. And he was talked about, at the same time, as likely to be offered the presidency of Yale University. A political opponent remarked: "Charlie Taft can't decide whether he is for God, for Country, or for Yale!"

Unrequited Loyalty

At fifty-four, Charles Taft feels he is ready for the governorship. And a good many people feel the governorship is ready for him. His brother is not among these, however. Charles and Robert talked the matter over three or four times, and reached no real meeting of minds. Robert is unhappy at his brother's entry into Ohio politics at this delicate moment in his own career, but hasn't found a graceful way to head him off.

And as always, the fraternal cooperation of Taft brothers is a one-way street. Charles has campaigned for the Republican Party in every national election from 1928 to 1948, except for one race—that of 1944—when as a Federal official he was gagged by the Hatch Act. He has campaigned for his brother in season and out, and is filling speaking engagements on his behalf even now.

And Robert? Hard on the heels of Charles's announcement, he announced from Kansas City that he would do nothing for or against his brother. It was a policy fully expected by those who know the record; but it was also a show of intrafamily frigidity that antagonized many Ohioans. There is a case for Robert's hands-off policy. Presidents rarely interfere in party primaries. A President couchant, ready to spring into the White House, may well follow this policy. But the precedent was not set by would-be Presidents with brothers seeking governorships. And Robert's crisp abandonment of his brother on the ground of near-Presidential impartiality would come with better grace if in years past Robert had not interfered, gratuitously, in local Cincinnati council campaigns against the Charter forces led by Charles. The annals of our political families offer few more marked examples of unrequited fraternal loyalty.

Although for many years Charles has subordinated his political ambitions to his brother's, he has not sacrificed his own ideas or principles. His concept of

liberalism has matured with the years, but has not been twisted out of shape in the service of family loyalty. During the ill-starred G.O.P. campaign of 1936, Charles joined the Alf Landon brain trust, and worked hard to get the Kansan and his party to accept the best of the New Deal reforms—those certain to stay because the people would never let them go. He wrote a persuasive little book, *You and I—and Roosevelt*, to define a liberal Republicanism that could condemn the defects of New Dealism and yet meet the valid aspirations of the American rank and file. When Landon was persuaded by the high brass of the party to abandon his line, Charles packed his bags and went back to Cincinnati without waiting for the avalanche to fall.

Charlie and Alf

Earlier in 1936, Charles Taft was a favorite among young Republican groups, and there was a strong movement to put him on the Landon ticket in second place. This project to liberalize the G.O.P. might have won a generation of younger voters who came out of school and college only to join the bread lines. But it was squelched quietly. Credit for the squelching is generally given to John B. Hollister, then a Congressman and Robert Taft's law partner. It is difficult to believe that Hollister acted without Robert Taft's approval.

That was an important year. The G.O.P. had the chance to leave Harding and Hoover behind and turn to a liberalism of the sort Teddy Roosevelt had evolved and which William Howard Taft had embraced. As President, William Howard Taft challenged the reactionary leadership of the Ohio G.O.P. in an unforgettable speech at Akron. Later, friendly to the League of Nations, he offered his party an enlightened internationalism instead of Henry Cabot Lodge's cyclone-cellular concept of foreign policy. And as Chief Justice the elder Taft stood with Holmes in dissent on the Minimum Wage Decision of 1923. Charles, more than Robert, is the exponent of their father's cautious but conscientious liberalism.

The bedrock issue in Ohio is whether Charles's campaign will hurt Robert's. The latter-day Mark Hannas of Ohio whisper that it will. Ed Schorr, mindful of the perils of reform in Ohio politics,

is dead certain it will. But those who have no ax to grind see it otherwise. Almost certainly Charles's name on the ticket would help his brother. There are several reasons.

Charles has a strong following among church people in Ohio—the state, by the way, with the fourth largest farm population of the forty-eight. Ironically, he also has had far happier relations with Catholics than Robert, who rubbed them the wrong way on the school-aid bill and still hasn't dispelled all their fears. And although the governor of Ohio has nothing to do with foreign policy, Charles's candidacy will make many thoughtful voters ignore Robert's isolationist record with better grace. While Robert was a headliner at America First meetings a decade ago, Charles helped organize the Cincinnati branch of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Also, Charles will never be caught making apologies for Senator McCarthy. Named on the ticket in 1952, he will give the Taft name a dignity and warmth—a human quality—it otherwise would lack for many independent-minded, independent-voting Ohioans.

The Man to Beat—Lausche

The primary election is not much of a problem. Charles should take it with ease—although Ed Schorr's hostility

forces him to spend more money. The tough job is to beat Frank J. Lausche in November. (Governor Lausche has a well-earned reputation for doing the unexpected, and may switch to the Senate race to take on Senator Bricker. But a governorship in the hand probably will look better to him than a Senate seat in the bush.)

For reasons nobody can quite explain, Frank Lausche is a hard man to beat in an election. He is more or less of a Catholic, but he woos the small-town Protestants with periodic (and rather ineffective) anti-gambling campaigns. He is an orator in the tradition of William Jennings Bryan, but commits himself to far less. And though nominally a Democrat, Lausche is more bipartisan than the Vandenberg foreign policy. He is actively disliked and distrusted by great numbers of orthodox Democrats.

When he learned that Charles P. Taft was entering the race against him, Governor Lausche said plaintively: "After all I did for Bob Taft last year, I don't see why the Tafts would do this to me!" It would be a strange remark for any Democrat north of the Mason and Dixon Line—except Frank Lausche.

The second hurdle looks higher, but the May 6 primary is closer. Once nominated, Charles is sure of the full support of all the Ohio G.O.P. organization except the hardest of die-hards—especially if Robert also is nominated. If they have no other reason, party men will remember that Robert will have to resign from the Senate by January 20, 1953, to take the Presidency. And if Governor Lausche is re-elected, he won't appoint a Republican to Robert's vacant seat, no matter how bipartisan he is.

For the months just ahead, then, Ohio has an unfamiliar but not unwelcome change of political pace. For the first time since William Howard tangled with Ohio's G.O.P. machine forty years ago, a Taft is moving on the ramparts of William McKinley's command post at Columbus. Only people with long memories know it, but Charles P. Taft is—far more than "Mr. Republican"—the inheritor of his father's tolerant, well-intentioned, cautious liberalism. And the governorship Charles seeks has led upward in politics more often than the Senate seat Robert holds.



Frank J. Lausche

The Next Investigation: Alien Property


ROBERT G. LEWIS

IN THE OFFICE of Harold Baynton, a Nevadan in his forties who is an Assistant U.S. Attorney General in charge of the Office of Alien Property, there is an old, dull, and badly nicked Japanese sword which the government vested, or took over, early in the war. The sword, which is listed by independent auditors as valueless, is not likely to stir up much controversy when Congress reconvenes next month, but much of the other \$300 million worth of alien assets seized by the government during the war and now controlled by Baynton's office undoubtedly will. Charges of graft, favoritism, and bungling have already begun to fly, and Senators like Alexander Wiley and Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin are calling for a full-scale investigation of the government's handling of alien property during and since the Second World War. Such an investigation seems bound to come.

When it does, the public will get its first long look at a little-known, highly complicated government office, a living vestige of the war that to most appearances ended six years ago. It will see in Baynton a \$15,000-a-year official who is the custodian of whole corporations, blocks of stock in others, and miscellaneous patents, copyrights, and contracts, all together worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and who has power over the appointment of corporation officials and lawyers earning many times his own salary.

The Super-Stockholder

The investigation of Baynton's bureau will go back at least as far as December, 1941, when, under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Attorney General began seizing all assets in this country owned by enemy nationals and turning them over to the Custodian of Alien



Wide World

Louis Johnson

Property, then an independent agency reporting directly to the President, now called the Office of Alien Property and under the Attorney General. The OAP at present exists primarily to sell the property it has taken over since 1941. Eventually, proceeds go to the War Claims Fund, to be used mostly for compensating former American prisoners of war.

The law, however, provides that the OAP may not sell until all claims to or against vested property have been settled in the courts. This frequently is a long and slow process. The Office of Alien Property consequently still controls hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of property, including entire business enterprises, which for obvious reasons must be maintained as going concerns.

The government assumed control of enemy-owned companies by taking over their capital stock. It does not manage the companies directly, but

votes its stock like any private stockholder. The head of Alien Property picks directors to represent the vested stock, and so when the government owns a controlling interest he is effectively in control of the company. The directors, following traditional corporate practices, select the corporation's officials and lawyers, who may earn extremely large salaries and fees. There are no precedents to guide the head of the OAP in his function of super-stockholder. He has only two standards to go by—the legal admonition that the public interest be served, and the standard set by comparable business enterprises.

The first obstacle to selling the property and ending what is at best a trying custodianship is, of course, the claims advanced by former owners. Sometimes, particularly when these are refugees, the claims are honored. The rest of the valuable properties and industrial secrets include prizes eagerly sought in the business world. Some of the companies were links in international cartels, often with labyrinthine and sometimes secret relationships to big American companies. Some are flourishing and profitable enterprises in their own right, which American businessmen would like to buy to strengthen their competitive positions or even establish or re-establish monopolistic patterns. A complex struggle goes on among economic empire builders for the plums in the Alien Property orchard.

In disposing of the property, the OAP is under severe regulations. First of all, it must, at every stage in the operation, keep an eye on Federal anti-trust laws. Patents and contract rights cannot, for instance, be returned to their original owners, no matter how valid the claim, if this would lead to a violation of anti-trust regulations. The property is sold

under sealed bids, which are publicly opened and recorded; but if sale to the highest bidder would establish a monopoly in the view of the Justice Department, the bid is rejected.

The Wiley Charges

This, in rough outline, is the background of the agency at which Senator Wiley recently fired his blunderbuss. He complained that persons who have claims to seized property have received "high-handed" and "dictatorial" treatment. He alluded to "behind the scenes influences" which have an "inside track" in purchasing seized property. Both these charges are serious enough, but a third seems even more explosive politically. Following the lead of certain columnists, Wiley said that "political favorites" have the highest-paid jobs in the controlled companies.

The Senator demanded a full report

from Baynton on the operations of the ten largest companies under Alien Property control, along with the names and the compensations of the leading officers. Baynton complied readily; at the time of this writing, he has released his reports on three of the ten, including the General Aniline and Film Corporation, by far the largest, and its sister corporation, General Dyestuff.


The two companies are an economic unit and together represent the largest U.S. units of the German I. G. Farben cartel. General Aniline manufactures dyestuffs, chemicals, and photographic supplies; during the Second World War, it was the sole producer in the United States of iron carbonyl, all of which went to the armed forces for indispensable uses in electronics. Since then it has been the sole producer of a chemical substitute for blood plasma. General Dyestuff has an indefinite con-

tract with General Aniline to be its exclusive sales representative.

Baynton's letter to Wiley confirmed what has long been common knowledge—that some Democrats have made big hauls as officers of seized companies.

Louis Johnson, former Secretary of Defense, was paid \$243,969 over seven years by General Aniline and General Dyestuff. Johnson was president of General Dyestuff from July, 1942, to February, 1947, a director of the same company from July, 1942, to March, 1949, and a director of General Aniline from July, 1943, to March, 1949. He resigned when he was appointed to the Cabinet and has since held no offices in companies under Alien Property control.

In addition, Johnson's law firm, Steptoe and Johnson, has collected \$346,016 in legal fees from the two companies, Baynton reported. Steptoe



Farben and General Aniline, 1941

and Johnson became general counsel for General Aniline in 1947 and still has the job. It replaced Wickes, Ridell, Bloomer, Jacobi & McGuire, which was paid \$348,086 from 1942 to 1947. The highest-paid firm retained by the corporations is Langner, Parry, Card & Langner, a highly regarded patent-law firm, which received \$415,271 between 1943 and June, 1951.

Another well-paid officer in General Aniline is Jack Frye of Phoenix, Arizona, former Trans World Airlines official, who makes no bones about being a Democrat. From August 1, 1947, to October 31, 1951, he got \$274,833 as board chairman and president.

In Rebuttal

Critics will certainly make much of the presence of acknowledged Democrats high up on the payroll. There are two related questions they may ignore:

How the officers have done their jobs.

How their pay stacks up against pre-war General Aniline and Dyestuffs standards.

Baynton contends that the corporation officers have performed pretty well. General Aniline, doubtless aided by general prosperity, has more than doubled in net worth—from \$35 million to \$82.5 million—under government control. It has paid dividends of \$8 million to the government, and excess-profits and income taxes of \$50 million.

Baynton also points out that salaries and legal fees were higher while the company was under Farben control than they are now.

Dietrich Schmitz, who resigned as president shortly before the government took over, earned \$90,000 in 1940; Rudolf Hutz, the first vice-president, \$85,000. When the government took over, the president was paid \$50,000 a year. The incumbent, Jack Frye, is drawing \$72,000 a year.

As for legal fees, the company paid out \$542,566 under Farben management in 1940. The highest amount for any year of government operation was \$321,159 in 1946. Last year the total was \$156,161, and it has been as low as \$112,983, in 1943.

This, so far, is the general outline of Baynton's defense of his office. The other reports show the same general decline in salaries and legal fees under government control.



Wide World

Senator Wiley

There was no sign of a Congressional investigation of the Alien Property Office until the summer of 1951, although for some months before that Washington columnists had been hinting, mostly by citing Johnson's remuneration, that there should be one.

Halbach and Farben

The issue finally came before the Senate when Senator Wiley proposed an amendment to the peace declaration with Germany which would allow U.S. citizens whose property had been vested to reopen their suits against the government even if they had previously settled. The amendment was defeated. Wiley later said that he had been prompted by the case of one Ernest Halbach, a U.S. citizen who had held a controlling interest in General Dyestuff at the time of vesting. When Halbach's stock was seized, the government contended that he was a "cloak" for Farben.

It was under pressure from the Justice Department that opposition to Wiley's amendment crystallized. The department had made it clear to Administration Senators that the rider would reopen a large number of cases in addition to Halbach's. The cases, all of which had been closed through voluntary agreement, involved property valued at \$16 million.

Opponents of the Wiley rider were particularly bitter about one clause providing that the proceeds of an out-of-court settlement would not need to be surrendered even if the government should win the reopened cases. This would have given ex-owners a chance to sue for stocks many of which had gained in value under government control. But even if the government won the suit and proved that the ex-owners were entitled to nothing at all, the original settlement could not be recovered.

Since Halbach's contention that he had been treated unfairly by the government sparked Senator Wiley's interest in the Office of Alien Property and led him to demand an investigation, the General Dyestuff case bears looking into.

A native-born American, Halbach started work at seventeen in a company that was the U.S. sales outlet for one of the German companies that merged in 1925 to form the I. G. Farben cartel. General Dyestuff was formed at the same time by a merger of the American companies that were sales outlets of the German companies. Halbach was president of General Dyestuff from 1930 until it was seized just after we entered the war.

Halbach's connection with the Farben cartel was traced in detail in evidence presented to the Kilgore Committee on Elimination of German Resources for War six years ago. Much of the evidence came from U.S. Army investigators in Germany after the war, and from company records examined after the seizure.

According to the committee's testimony, Halbach traveled to Milan, Italy, in January, 1940, to confer with Farben agents on how to evade the British blockade on German exports, particularly to South America. That year his efforts won him a high commendation from Alfredo Moll, Farben's chief agent in South America. In a secret message to the cartel's headquarters in Germany, Moll made this interesting comment:

"... I may especially express here the friendly attitude and fair cooperation noticeable with Mr. Halbach and Mr. Neisser [both of General Dyestuff] who try to help as much as they can..."

Shortly after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, stock in General Dyestuff

and General Aniline and Film was seized by the government.

The Control Levers

At the time of vesting, Ernest Halbach was the majority stockholder in General Dyestuff. But the government contended that Farben had organized both companies and controlled them in various ways throughout their existence. General Aniline stock, it was proved, was held by I. G. Chemie of Basle, Switzerland, which had direct ties with Farben. General Dyestuff was controlled by Farben in two ways. First, Farben placed handpicked and trusted lieutenants in the top positions. Second, it held options on all the stock in the company.

The stock-option scheme was the legal basis for Farben's secret control of General Dyestuff. All stockholders in the company's entire history were subject to an option by which Farben or its agents could buy back the stock at a constant fixed price of a hundred dollars a share. Stockholders had all bought their stock at that price, regardless of book and real values.

At first, options on the stock were held directly by Farben. But in 1939, Farben turned the options over to Halbach and Walter Duisberg, a naturalized American, who is the son of a former chairman of the board of Farben. The government maintained that Farben, using these men as cloaks who could by unwritten agreement be fully trusted, kept control of the company.

In 1943 and 1944 respectively, Duisberg and Halbach sued for recovery of the stock. Duisberg later refused to let his suit go to trial, and the Federal Court in New Jersey entered a judgment in June, 1944, dismissing his case with prejudice. The dismissal has stood up under repeated appeals, including one to the Supreme Court. As a result, Duisberg has not received one cent.

Halbach's suit was scheduled for trial in January, 1945. Shortly before, Halbach's lawyer proposed an out-of-court settlement. A few days before the trial, an agreement was reached: Halbach settled for \$100 a share, the option price, plus a dividend of \$18 a share. The book value of the stock at that time was \$540 a share.

The government attorneys explain that the compromise settlement was made in anticipation of a possible judgment by the court that although Far-

ben had always had actual control of the stock, Halbach had a contract right to \$118 a share from Farben, the option price plus dividends. Furthermore, the settlement assured the government that the stock under no circumstances would go back to Halbach or Farben.

Halbach made \$340,000 through the settlement. He had paid a total of \$210,000 for his stock at the option price; the number of shares had been increased by two successive stock dividends of fifty per cent each.

A Powerful Group

Oddly enough, after the settlement, the Office of Alien Property kept Halbach on as a consultant to General Dyestuff and paid him up to \$83,000 a year until December, 1950, when he voluntarily retired with a lifetime annual pension of \$18,000.

The original decision to keep Halbach on the payroll was made by Leo Crowley, once head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, then Custodian of Alien Property. Crowley explained that he was convinced of Halbach's personal patriotism, and that he considered him indispensable to the operation of the company. One of Crowley's successors, James E. Markham, took the position that he should not fire Halbach as long as his suit was pending. Subsequent OAP

heads left the matter up to the board of directors, who kept him on the payroll.

But in January, 1951, Halbach filed a motion in the District Court of New Jersey to reopen the case. The motion was based on an affidavit by Crowley charging gross misconduct and duress on the part of government officials in dealing with Halbach.

Crowley's affidavit said that "a powerful group" in Washington "contrived constant pressure upon me as Alien Property Custodian to remove Halbach" from General Dyestuff.

"In my opinion, Halbach, in concluding the transaction [his settlement with the government] did not feel himself in a position to do arm-length's bargaining. He acted under compulsion, calculated to break his will by extra-legal methods . . ."

This was "one of the shameful injustices of the war," Crowley charged.

Impressed by the gravity of the allegation, the Justice Department asked Crowley to furnish details and names.

What Crowley said in a deposition on April 3, 1951, weakened several of the main points in his affidavit.

The "powerful group" turned out to be Crowley's subordinates. Crowley withdrew the word "powerful."

He admitted that "constant pressure" was "maybe a little bit too strong." The "pressure" turned out to be mainly newspaper stories criticizing Crowley for permitting Halbach to remain as virtual manager of General Dyestuff.

"One of the shameful injustices of the war," Crowley now said, had been committed not by the government, but "by the fact that the press kept up continually harping on this man that he ought to be removed."

Wiley on the Trail

After that, Halbach could not reopen his suit. But in July, 1951, Crowley, who is now chairman of the board of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul, sent a letter to Senator Wiley, drawing his attention to the injustice he alleged had been done to Halbach. Wiley gave Crowley credit, in the Senate on October 17, 1951, for prompting his intervention in Halbach's behalf:

"I have no apology to make. Let the Senators read Leo Crowley's letter, the letter of a man decorated by the Pope, a man so highly regarded that he is president of the Milwaukee



Jack Frye

Railroad, the letter of a man who feels an injustice was done to an American citizen, not to Germans."

Several weeks before Crowley asked Wiley's help for Halbach, the OAP had turned down another claim to vested property, put in two officials of the International Silk Guild, Inc. The Silk Guild had claimed an advertising fund that was seized in 1942 on the ground that it had been provided by the Japanese silk trade. One of the two officials was R. D. Jenkins, vice-president of the Guild and Senator Wiley's brother-in-law.

After the Senate had rejected Senator Wiley's rider, he quickly demanded a full-scale investigation of the Office

of Alien Property, and his junior colleague from Wisconsin, Senator Joe McCarthy, chimed in:

"From what I hear they've been doing a foul job down there," he said.

Baynton has hotly denied the Wisconsin Senators' charge. He has said he is not in the least afraid to face an investigation:

"We've made a clean record on this job, and we're proud of it."

Baynton did not elaborate on how far back the "we" goes. But as a loyal Democrat, he may feel obliged to stand behind the entire record of the agency since Pearl Harbor. If so, he will have the ticklish problem of defending the OAP's dealings with Ernest

Halbach. Some government officials and Congressmen wonder why Halbach was ever retained at such high remuneration after his connection with I. G. Farben was revealed. They may even turn the investigation in a direction unintended by Senator Wiley and ask why the agency has been so merciful, not so cruel, toward the ex-employees of enemy business.

The investigation is bound to generate a good deal of political heat, with all the made-to-order banner stories on Democrats receiving large salaries, holders of enemy property being either abused or coddled, and favored or unfavored purchasers receiving or not receiving "inside tracks."

'Down with Income Taxes!'

An aggressive lobby has squarely faced up to the problem of high taxes by trying to make them unconstitutional

MINNA POST PEYSER

A MOVEMENT is afoot to repeal the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. That amendment, which was adopted in 1913, reads as follows:

"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States and without regard to any census or enumeration."


The groups behind the movement to repeal this amendment would substitute a new one imposing a flat twenty-five per cent limit on the amount the Federal government could tax incomes, inheritances, and gifts during peacetime. Such a limit would, of course, endanger the financial commitments, foreign and domestic, that our government has made in recent years. But the movement has been making a good deal of quiet and almost unnoticed legislative progress.

The sponsors have made use of a generally overlooked procedure for amending the Constitution—one that has never in our history been used successfully. There are two ways of amending the Constitution specified in its Article V. The first is for a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Congress to propose an amendment, which must then be ratified by three-fourths of the states—through either their legislatures or by approval of popular conventions. The Twenty-First Amend-

ment (repeal of prohibition) was ratified by conventions; all the others so far have been ratified by the state legislatures.

The other method, never used to date, is for two-thirds of the state legislatures to petition Congress to call a special Constitutional convention, which may then by-pass Congress entirely and propose amendments of its own, to be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures or by conventions called in three-fourths of the states.

A Constitutional convention called to take up the twenty-five per cent limit on income taxes would not be restricted to the consideration of that particular matter, but could conceivably set about rewriting the entire Constitution, article by article. The petitions of thirty-two state legislatures would make up the two-thirds required to call the convention. Twenty-five legislatures have already petitioned—



mostly by one-sided or unanimous votes. Some have since voted to rescind their petitions under pressure from labor groups, but there is some legal doubt as to whether a state *can* rescind such a petition. The proponents of the tax limit believe that if seven more states fall in line the convention will be held in a few years.

At present, six legislatures have the resolution in committee or pending on the floor, and in eight states the proposal has been given the formal blessing of one of the two legislative houses. Obviously, this is not a hopeless campaign. It may well gain a partial, if not a total, victory even before the American people in general are aware of it or take it seriously.

Turning Back the Clock

The arguments put forward by the proponents of the new amendment are familiar. The "redistribution-of-the-wealth radicals," they charge, have distorted the Sixteenth Amendment, which, they point out, was ratified in 1913 only after Congress gave assurances that a tax rate of ten per cent was unthinkably high and would never be exceeded. Now, according to the Committee for Constitutional Government, one of the staunchest sponsors of the proposed amendment, "power has been misused to siphon revenues into Washington until local self governments face the danger of becoming bankrupt and powerless pawns of federal bureaucracy." Much of the responsiveness of state legislatures has probably also been due to the skillful interweaving in the campaign of the venerable "state rights" theme.

The historical origins of the movement seem to have been deliberately beclouded by the sponsors themselves. Three organizations, each apparently operating independently, are its spearhead: the Committee for Constitutional Government, the American Taxpayers Association, and the Western Tax Council. Each claims credit for having conceived, inspired, and master-minded the scheme. Each avoids open alliance with the others.

The movement seems to have received most of its impetus from the Committee for Constitutional Government, a lobby founded by Frank Gannett and Edward F. Rumely to challenge the "inroads of socialism" being made by the New Deal. Robert Dresser,



Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 1776

a Rhode Island businessman and tax expert, is credited with conceiving the project and framing the resolution that has been passed, with slight variations in wording, by twenty-five states since 1939. The Committee, perhaps because of its recent difficulties with the Buchanan Committee of Congress, which has been investigating lobbies, now plays only a minor role in sponsoring the amendment.

The American Taxpayers Association, Inc., was formed to observe developments in Federal taxation and advise its fifteen to eighteen thousand members on them. Through its executive secretary, Daniel Edward Casey, it claims all credit for the success of the tax-ceiling movement.

In 1938 and again in 1939, Emanuel Celler, a Democratic Congressman from New York with a record for supporting liberal legislation, introduced resolutions calling for a Constitutional amendment to limit income, gift, and estate taxes to twenty-five per cent. He later admitted that he had done so at the instigation of the American Taxpayers Association. Both resolutions died in committee, as have all other such measures since. As recently as June, 1951, however, Congressmen Noah M. Mason (R., Illinois) and Frederic Coudert, Jr. (R., New York), made similar proposals.

The third and most formidable sponsor is the Western Tax Council. Its vigorous and tautological leader, Frank Packard, asserts that the movement for a twenty-five per cent tax limit is "the *raison d'être* for the existence of this organization. . . . we organized in 1939 solely for securing the passage of this amendment, and that is the sole aim of our activity."

From 1939 to 1945, seventeen petitions were sent to Congress from as many states. Then the movement slowed down to a standstill for a few years. In Congress, Representative Wright Patman (D., Texas) bitterly denounced the proposed amendment, and also the Committee for Constitutional Government as the "most sinister lobby ever organized." The Treasury Department presently made its unsympathetic views known.

The Silent Explosion

But in 1948 Frank Packard resigned from Standard Oil of Indiana and took over the directorship of the Western Tax Council. In his own words, "I spit on my hands and began to revive our field staff, rewrite our literature and badger all sorts of people for financial support. . . . Since then, I am happy to believe that the Council has taken a new lease on life."

It is astonishing that this proposal



Carpenters' Hall, meeting place of the Continental Congress, 1774

could have progressed so far with so little notice from the press and the public. The sponsors have capitalized mainly on the general lack of interest in the routine doings of state legislatures. Far from the Washington spotlight, and unmolested for twelve years by the press or any organized opposition, they have worked quietly and efficiently.

Many legislators have undoubtedly voted for the resolution out of conviction that the Federal government's power must be curtailed or that the states must get a larger share of tax money. But a good many others, it can be assumed, voted without much thought. To a state legislator in, say, Baton Rouge, it is a long road from an "aye" to an amendment that would fundamentally change the role of the U.S. government. Unaware of the importance of the issue, the legislator willingly accedes to the urgings of local businessmen. ". . . in every state this resolution is handled in a most undercover manner," a prominent labor leader has charged. "In Kentucky it was even omitted from the daily legislative digest. . . . The technique generally used is to slip it through [in] the closing days, along with hundreds of other resolutions. I have never heard of public hearings being held in State Legislatures on this resolution."

'Small Business'

The resources of those who favor tax limitations are impressive. In only a few months of 1950 the Chambers of Commerce in eight major cities each offered Packard public platforms on which to explain his position in full. The American Taxpayers Association works through an organization known as the Small Business Economic

Foundation, which, according to the House Small Business Committee, gets a great deal of its money from such small businesses as Standard Oil of New Jersey, U.S. Steel, Standard Oil of Indiana, Socony-Vacuum, and the Texas Company.

The absence of any significant opposition further explains the ease with which the movement has rolled up its impressive score. A few state cto councils have fought the proposal, and in some instances have succeeded either in defeating it or in securing rescinding action. The AFL has only recently joined the opposition. Last May President William Green sent a letter to his state officials which said, in part, "If this substitute amendment to the Constitution is adopted, it can only mean that a national sales tax is on the way in and the burden of taxation will be shifted to an even greater disproportionate basis onto the backs of those . . . least able to pay . . ." Only the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen has resisted the movement since its inception.

New Strategy

The failure of the resolution in Minnesota shows how a little publicity might have defeated it in many other states. There it was introduced by a group of legislators, including the Speaker of the House and the chairmen of the tax committees of both houses. A cto lobbyist took the matter up with Professor Walter Heller of the University of Minnesota, consultant on the Tax Advisory Staff of the Treasury Department. Professor Heller, in turn, persuaded Senator Hubert Humphrey to write a letter to every member of the state legislature condemning the proposal. The letter drew some local press notice, and four days later the proposal was killed.

The resolution will be resubmitted soon to the state legislature of New York by Assemblyman Orlo Brees. In California the movement has been given a boost by the visit of Vivian Kellems, the Connecticut manufacturer, during an organizational drive for her anti-tax organization, the Liberty Belles.

In the early stages, the strategy of the sponsors was to gather up, as quietly as possible, the required thirty-two states and then present the nation with a *fait accompli*. But about 1948 a

basic shift became evident. The idea of calling a Constitutional convention was gradually replaced by that of making the legislatures call on Congress itself to propose the repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment and the substitution of a tax-limitation amendment. As the new strategy gains momentum, the sponsors find publicity more and more desirable. Within the past few months there have been more editorials on the issue than were published in all the twelve years that the amendment has been kicking around state legislatures.

In New York City, the *Mirror*, the *World-Telegram and Sun*, and the *Daily News* have commented favorably on the movement. The *Daily News* apologized to its readers for not having taken the movement seriously before. As the drive accelerates, direct appeals will probably be made to the public. With twenty-five states signed up, the proponents now feel safe enough to risk national attention in an attempt to exert pressure on Congress and on state legislatures to hop on the band wagon. Congress might be persuaded to interpret the success of the movement in the state legislatures as a public mandate which Congress itself must honor by submitting the amendment formally back to the states. Its proponents hope for this short cut to victory.

Sponsors of the movement to limit Federal income taxes to twenty-five per cent report that the legislatures of the following states have petitioned Congress to call a Constitutional convention: Wyoming, Rhode Island, Mississippi, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Arkansas, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Hampshire, Illinois, Texas, Wisconsin, Alabama, Kentucky, New Jersey, Nebraska, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Kansas, Florida, and Utah. (The states are listed in the order in which their legislatures voted for the petition.)



MacArthur's Place in History

A tentative evaluation of the general as a military figure from the viewpoint of the fragmentary evidence now in hand

H. A. DEWEERD

IT IS a curious fact that of all the statements which accompanied General Douglas MacArthur's dismissal last spring, the one which escaped violent discussion was one of the most controversial. "General MacArthur's place in history," said the President, "is fully established." This, no doubt, reflected the opinion of millions of Americans, but it was not a statement of fact. It will be many years before MacArthur's "place in history is fully established," even in the military sphere.

There are many reasons for this. For one thing, the records of military operations in the Philippines in 1941-1942 are incomplete. Secondly, the Army Historical Division's efforts to carry out its job in relation to MacArthur's areas of command were delayed while General Charles A. Willoughby remained as G-2 in Tokyo. The volumes on strategy in the official history series on the Second World War, which will show the origin of planning and the over-all control of theaters by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are still unpublished. The great mass of staff documents which alone can reveal what each individual leader contributed to the war effort is still classified. It is impossible now to determine precisely what MacArthur did or didn't do, what he must be given credit for or charged with.

Even when these reports are available many years hence, historians will have trouble reconciling MacArthur's own statements with the facts established. Here they will be confronted with the general's capacity for issuing conflicting statements in language so rich and stentorian that unless the



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As Chief of Staff

reader is alert, the sheer splendor of the latest one tends to conceal its divergences from the last. Indeed, unless historians can explain the almost anesthetic effect of MacArthur's language on uncritical minds, they will be hard pressed to convince their readers in years to come that a military figure who was wrong so often in his estimates and pronouncements was once regarded by millions of men as an almost perfect warrior and by at least one Congressman as co-equal with the Deity.

Allowance will also have to be made for the impact of MacArthur's colorful and powerful personality on a wide circle of journalists and military associates. Here the historian will find a capacity for self-advertisement as efficient as, and more ruthless than, the armies MacArthur commanded. While it may be simple to explain how MacArthur took some journalists into his camp, and how he harnessed certain military underlings such as Colonel Sidney C. Huff and Generals Jonathan Wainwright, Richard K. Sutherland, and Willoughby to his publicity band wagon, it will be more difficult to explain how such a tough, tenacious, and critically minded fighter as General George C. Kenney was won over to a position of almost unreserved admiration. All this is going to take so much time that when MacArthur's place in history is finally established, the present controversy will have been hushed to a murmur of scholars in the sterile, air-conditioned gloom of the Archives Building.

It is too much now to ask for anyone



Harris & Ewing

In Korea, 1950

to take a completely objective attitude toward MacArthur. The best that can be hoped for is a tentative objectivity about his career *preceding* the Korean War. It may be useful, however, to contrast the claims of his supporters against the assertions of his critics.

West Point and After

About MacArthur's early career there is little controversy. He was first in his class at West Point, the youngest divisional commander in the A.E.F., the youngest commandant at West Point, the youngest Chief of Staff in American history. He had a fine fighting record in the First World War and commanded the 42nd Division with distinction. Prophetically enough, the only untoward occurrences in that war were typical of MacArthur's later difficulties. He was given a verbal spanking by General Pershing for speaking out of turn on a policy matter connected with the employment of his troops as replacements, and he was deeply affronted when the U.S. 2nd Division cut across his division's front in the race for Séダン in November, 1918.

Herbert Hoover made MacArthur Chief of Staff in 1930, and naturally he never had funds enough to do very much. Retrenchment was the order of the day. His critics claim that MacArthur did little or nothing to push the development of anti-tank artillery and that he strangled Lieutenant Colonel Adna Chaffee's independent "mechanized force" in its crib at Fort Eustis. Not even the most hidebound cavalry officer could complain about Mac-

Arthur's statement in 1932 that tanks would be fully developed only when they could perform all the functions "hitherto devolving upon the horse." His critics also claim that MacArthur was confused about the capabilities of aircraft and unwisely opposed the creation of an independent air force.

In reply his supporters can show that in 1932 only three or four distinguished soldiers in the world demonstrated much foresight about armored formations, and these few were regarded as dangerous cranks. If MacArthur was confused about the capabilities of aircraft, he was not alone. They can call attention properly to MacArthur's modest achievements in establishing the four-army-area system, to his planning for the so-called "Initial Protective Force," and to his establishment of the GHQ Air Force. But they should not claim that he was a great Chief of Staff; he belongs in the second rank with men like John L. Hines, Peyton C. March, Charles P. Summerall, and Malin Craig.

One of MacArthur's actions as Chief of Staff has given rise to considerable controversy: his banishment of Colonel George C. Marshall to the Illinois National Guard. At least two interpretations of MacArthur's motive are possible. One—very unlikely—is that MacArthur felt that the Illinois National Guard needed the best staff officer in the Army. The other is that by placing a colonel of Marshall's age on detached service, MacArthur tried to keep a promising candidate from getting the experience necessary for a later appointment as Chief of Staff.

This type of maneuver is not unknown in the military profession. Marshal Joffre quietly tried to cut the professional throat of General Foch, his most likely successor, shortly before he lost his job in 1916. The subtle and lethal character of service politics is generally accompanied, of course, by stout protestations of "loyalty" and "honor." Watching this sort of thing go on in the German Army from 1914-1918, General Max Hoffmann was led to declare that he would knock the head off the first officer who uttered the word "loyalty" in his presence.

In the Philippines

About MacArthur's career in the Philippines from 1935-1941 a welter of controversy rages. Here it was his func-

tion to prepare a Philippine force capable of defending the islands without outside aid, after independence in 1946. His critics maintain that this was a fantastic mission and that MacArthur was wildly optimistic. No important military officer acquainted with the situation in the Philippines has gone on record as agreeing with MacArthur about the possibility of defending the islands. Certainly his frequent statements that an invasion of the Philippines would be illogical, impractical, and impossible make amusing reading today. Yet any officer undertaking such an assignment would have to do so with some confidence in its success.

What places this phase of MacArthur's reputation beyond salvage is the variety and absurdity of his pronouncements regarding the progress of his defense forces and their capacity to repel a Japanese invasion *as late as November, 1941*. His supporters can argue that he was not allotted the five years anticipated between 1941 and 1946, but there can be little doubt that the defense provisions contemplated by MacArthur would have failed as dismally against Japan in 1946 as they did in 1941-1942.



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Testifying in 1935

The MacArthur defense plan called for the creation and training by 1946 of twelve Philippine divisions, plus reserves, and a navy consisting of 150 motor torpedo boats. According to Colonel Huff, MacArthur believed that a fleet of small wooden boats would deter or cripple a seaborne invasion and that the Philippine divisions could handle any force that got ashore. How 150 motorboats were to watch over seven thousand islands he never fully explained. Students of American history will be struck by the similarity between this odd proposal and Jefferson's dream of defending the shorter coastline of the United States with a fleet of midget gunboats. Fortunately for our country, a heavy storm threw most of Jefferson's midgets far up on the beach.

There was no such providential storm in the Pacific. MacArthur was still relying on P-T boats but in smaller numbers in 1941. He had secured delivery of two Thornycroft models from Britain and a half a dozen P-T boats from the United States before the invasion which he so often dismissed as illogical and impractical overwhelmed his unready command.

In rebuttal, General MacArthur's defenders can assert with some point that when their hero spoke so confidently about Philippine defense, he counted on British and American naval forces in the Pacific—forces which disappeared at Pearl Harbor and off Malaya. They can also contend that the defensibility of many areas was grossly misjudged in those days: Poland, France, and Singapore.

ORANGE 3

MacArthur's conduct of the Philippine defense in 1941-1942 has been subjected to sharp criticism. He was supreme commander and, like all others, has to accept responsibility for everything that happened in his command. This includes the destruction of most of his air force on the ground at Clark Field several hours after the news of Pearl Harbor was received. The efforts of General Sutherland to place all the blame on General Louis H. Brereton have been rebutted by Brereton and carefully analyzed in the first volume of the Air Force history. MacArthur's supporters would have done better to stress the hopeless odds against the Far East Air Force and to concede



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The ovation in New York

that sooner or later the 450 operational planes of the Japanese 11th Air Fleet and the Fifth Army Air Force based on Formosa would have overwhelmed the thirty-three B-17s and the ninety-odd pursuit planes in flying readiness anyway.

The early loss of our air strength could not be concealed. Less well understood, because the events were shrouded by censorship and confused by MacArthur's communiqués, was the conduct of ground operations. The American staff had worked for many years on the defense of Bataan and Corregidor. Their plan, ORANGE 3, based on the conviction that a campaign of maneuver against a Japanese invader would be doomed to disaster, had been tested in war games. It called for a withdrawal of all forces into defensive positions on Bataan and Corregidor and the immediate removal of food stocks to this area.

With more aggressiveness than discretion, MacArthur ignored these plans until December 23, 1941, and tried, Rommelwise, to meet the enemy on the beaches and plains of northern Luzon. Though his troops outnumbered the three Japanese divisions involved, they were outclassed in training, firepower, and mobility. When this gallant but futile effort was finally abandoned, it was too late to carry out the plan for stocking food on Bataan. Hordes of noncombatants were allowed to filter into the peninsula, and starvation ultimately cut short the defense.

MacArthur's supporters argue that

at a time when everybody else was running from the Japanese, it was a mark of his greatness that he took the war to them in northern Luzon. Military history, they contend, shows that it is possible to conduct offensive operations, but not a long defense, with poorly trained troops. They believe that since no relief forces were to be dispatched to the Philippines, the duration of the defense was not particularly important. No evidence was produced during the interrogation of Japanese leaders which seemed to indicate that their plans would have been seriously upset by a longer siege.

To Australia

To the Republicans, it must have seemed providential—all handy domestic issues having been swept away by the war—to find the last Republican appointee as Chief of Staff relegated to Australia and a comparatively low-priority theater in the Southwest Pacific. They had an issue—the war should be won first in the Pacific; and MacArthur had another grievance—he was being fed skim milk. But the consequences of the Anglo-American decision to defeat Germany first could not have been misunderstood by MacArthur.

General MacArthur's advocates believe that his magnetic presence galvanized the discouraged Australians into abandoning their plans for holding the Brisbane Line and that he pushed the offensive against the Japanese in New Guinea. He did, of course, conduct these operations, but it must be remembered that *all* war plans involving our ground forces were developed in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, approved by the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, and carried out under their direction. Like any other Allied theater commander, General MacArthur enjoyed a considerable amount of liberty as to how directives were to be carried out, but he did not originate them and was able to modify them only through normal channels.

MacArthur's greatest personal contribution to the direction of Allied strategy in the Pacific was a result of his constant advocacy of the Philippine route as the proper road to Tokyo. Here he opposed the Nimitz plan for by-passing the islands in favor of Formosa. The participants in the Nimitz



Harris & Ewing

Testifying in 1951

MacArthur-Roosevelt conferences at Honolulu agree that the President finally accepted MacArthur's proposal on moral rather than strategic grounds. Admiral Leahy, whose naval background in no way predisposed him to support MacArthur, came to the conclusion that the Philippines operation was the correct solution of the problem. Yet his critics charge that MacArthur's decision to carry out his famous promise "I shall return" only brought needless destruction to the islands. By this time the façade of Japan's strength was cracking all over the Pacific, and its eventual defeat was more a matter of time than of method or direction.

Operational Successes

If MacArthur's supporters must, therefore, reduce their claims about his prescience and originality in the strategic field, they can at least take some comfort from his success in the operational sphere. In this field his claims to fame are more securely anchored than in any other. Without winning the affection of his men, he was able to build armies of sound morale and high battlefield efficiency. He wrung from commanders as incompatible as Generals Walter Krueger and Robert L. Eichelberger remarkably uniform and effective leadership on the army level. Though confused about the capacity of aircraft in 1932, MacArthur showed a willingness to learn in 1943-1945. The use of air transport reached a new high in his theater. MacArthur mastered the art of jungle- and island-

hopping by advancing the battle line great distances at once, using airstrip construction as the measure of what could be accomplished. He conducted air-sea-ground operations with great skill and praiseworthy economy of life. Even such industrious critics as Richard Rovere and Arthur L. Schlesinger, Jr. (*The General and the President*), hold up their axes over the mangled remains of MacArthur's reputation long enough to admit that ". . . MacArthur surely was a great commander in chief."

But Douglas MacArthur was a great theater commander in spite of himself. His fine military accomplishments in the Second World War were accompanied by a pettiness in regard to publicity that antagonized not only his own troops but also the Navy. They were also accompanied by a stubbornness in defending the accuracy of his communiqués unique among American commanders. MacArthur had to be right even if the documents available after the war proved that he was wrong.

No other Allied headquarters showed equal sensitivity to criticism during or after the war. That his associates were thoroughly indoctrinated in this attitude is illustrated by General Willoughby's fantastic article in the December, 1951, issue of *Cosmopolitan* magazine. It remained for a much simpler soldier, General Omar N. Bradley, to sum up the relation of a military leader to his critics in a democratic country. "Generals are human," he wrote. "I know of none that are immune to error. . . . There is no place in a democratic state for the attitude that would elevate each military hero above public reproach simply because he did the job he was trained and is paid to do." MacArthur unhappily does not share Bradley's belief that "the wellsprings of humility lie in the field of command."

Nepotism and Nemesis

Concerning MacArthur's administration of the American army in Japan there has also been acrimonious debate. His critics insist that our troops were as poorly trained for their early tasks in Korea as MacArthur's forces were in the Philippine and Papuan campaigns. In reply it can be argued that occupation duties are not calculated to put troops in a state of high readiness for combat.

There would seem to be no defense



Harris & Ewing

At a prize fight last summer

against the charge that MacArthur surrounded himself in Tokyo with the officers who had served with him since prewar days in the Philippines. He retained the same chief of intelligence for ten years. The experience of other staffs has shown that rotation of officers is a healthy practice, particularly in intelligence work, where inbreeding is dangerous. Of course MacArthur paid heavily for this kind of military nepotism, but so did our country. Nemesis is a goddess whose stroke may be temporarily avoided but never escaped.

The question has appropriately been raised elsewhere whether the production-line methods of modern war actually permit the emergence of a great commander in the historic sense of the term. Careers like those of Montgomery, Rommel, and Patton seem to show that when a military leader develops some eccentricity of manner, dress, or behavior and achieves success, he immediately becomes a great general in the public mind. At the same time a colorless commander can conduct military operations with faultless professional skill and remain completely unknown. General Krueger, one of MacArthur's army commanders, is a case in point. Krueger rose from the rank of private to four-star general on merit alone. He was one of the men who helped make MacArthur's reputation in the Pacific, yet his name is not a household word. MacArthur got the glory. It is only fair to add that he had the responsibility and from 1943 through 1945 he delivered the goods.

Tito Trims His Sails

He has had to throw overboard both his hopes for neutralism and his bureaucracy's grandiose plans for industrialization

PETER J. ALLEN

THE MENACE at Yugoslavia's borders has finally compelled Marshal Tito to break with some of his most ardent admirers and to abandon his fond ambition of forming a "third force" with India, Burma, Indonesia, and some of the other Asian states. Tito's long and ardent flirtation with the neutralists has come to an end.

In October the Yugoslavs staged a Conference for Peace and International Co-operation at Zagreb, during which they spoke blunt words on various subjects they had been avoiding for some time. At this meeting they also began a new courtship. They rejected a Soviet-sponsored peace pact among the big powers; they denounced disarmament without international safeguards and controls; they made known to the world and to their own people their conviction that collective security is the best guarantee for peace. Tito's chief theoretician, Moshe Piyade, was named secretary of a permanent com-

mittee to implement the decisions taken in Zagreb. His main task will be to gather support from the very forces he was not long ago denouncing—the American, British, and non-Communist French trade unions, the German Social Democrats, and the Scandinavian Socialists.

Viewed as the demonstration of a fundamental change in Yugoslav foreign policy, the Zagreb meeting assumes more importance than might be indicated by the number and positions of the delegates. Of the 150-odd delegates and observers, the majority were there unofficially, speaking only for themselves. A few, including André Lafond, secretary of the French Force Ouvrière, Léon Bouthien of the French Socialist Party, and Gilbert Harrison of the American Veterans Committee, spoke with some authority, although even they were not empowered to commit their organizations to anything definite.

Though the Zagreb conference was primarily called to publicize Yugoslavia's new policy, it was carefully imbued with an international character. There were two official languages—French and English. The secretariat was completely Yugoslav, but its members did their best to conduct themselves as international civil servants, eliminating as much bias as possible toward speakers who opposed Yugoslav policy. Such an attitude may seem only fit and proper to Westerners, but one has only to keep in mind how Stalinists conduct their meetings to appreciate the distance the Yugoslavs have traveled since the Cominform break of June, 1948.

This impartial and democratic procedure in a public debate had a great significance for the people of Zagreb. They had witnessed nothing like it in twenty years, and the psychological impact was considerable.

The public was well informed, even



overinformed, about the proceedings in the Sobor (Parliament Building). Every word spoken, every move made was reported in the local press. The *Vesnyk* of Zagreb devoted about eighty per cent of its space to the conference. Photographs and drawings of the delegates were sprinkled here and there among the complete texts of the speeches. Other world news, such as the British elections, was relegated to small boxes on the last page.

A member of the Croatian Communist Party explained this disproportion as a heritage of Stalinist times. Editors had been told that this meeting would be "important," so they reported every detail—for fear of omitting something the party might consider worth reporting. "No doubt," the Croatian Communist went on, "not one citizen will read all the material. But our newspapermen do not yet have the training and the independence necessary for selective reporting."

Miss Humbert Misses Out

Some of the delegates—especially those who had been Tito's doctrinaire foreign supporters—did not grasp immediately the meaning of the conference. Agnès Humbert, for instance, had come from France to spread the old line of the equal responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union for the present world tensions. When she compared the "occupation of France by American G.I.s, American movies, and American products" with the occupation of eastern Europe by the Soviets, she was shouted down. "There is a difference, and an important one, between Coca-Cola and concentration camps," Miss Humbert was told by a fellow Socialist.

Gilbert Harrison of the A.V.C. said, "I will advise you on how to fight the attack on French culture which, you say, the mediocre American motion pictures represent. Just don't patronize the poor ones. I don't, and many of my friends don't." On the subject of the occupation of French soil by U.S. soldiers, Harrison was more emphatic. He too, he said, deplored the occupation of French soil—by the bodies of those G.I.s who died there in 1944 and 1945. Poor Miss Humbert had obviously missed the band wagon.

Bohumil Laushman, exiled leader of the Czechoslovak Socialists, got the conference back in progress toward

its main objective: "While some of us here talk about the oppression of colonial peoples, a new tyranny, the ferocity of which has no parallel in history, is enslaving the peoples of eastern Europe." After Laushman's statement, the pacifists and neutralists were isolated. Pastor Martin Niemöller from Germany did not have much success when he suggested East-West meetings and appeals to Moscow and Washington. The Indian proponents of passive resistance and the English defenders of conscientious objection were heard—but ignored. The aged Professor Henri Grégoire of the Royal Belgian Academy offered a slogan that became the theme of the meeting: "Let Zagreb become the gravestone of neutralism!"

There were a few slip-ups. Through an error (which members of the Yugoslav delegation acknowledged off the record) an amendment was passed welcoming "the efforts of those states that refuse to join one or the other power bloc." At first the Yugoslavs had seen this as praise for their own stand, but the implications soon became clear to Moshe Piyade. When the Resolutions Committee met to draft the final text, the welcome became "appreciation," and the whole amendment was finally buried in a paragraph concerned with the general question of the role of the United Nations.

The Worldsavers

The conference had its share of crackpots, special ax grinders, and perennial diplomatic supernumeraries. One

proposal to establish peace through music was expounded from the rostrum and submitted in writing to the Drafting Committee. An Englishman fought hard for the hasty convening of a world assembly at which the peoples of the world en masse would proclaim their will for peace. He had, he said, submitted this same proposal to numerous peace meetings in vain, and he hoped for better luck at Zagreb. In private, he explained that although he was a poor man, he was able to attend many foreign meetings because he was a railroad employee and benefited from substantial reductions in fare. Usually, too, the organizers of the meetings paid his room and board. He was only five pounds out of pocket for his Zagreb trip.

The sincerity of such lovers of humanity and music was touching, but some of the political figures who persuaded the Belgrade government to pay for a prolonged stay in Yugoslavia to further their irresistible desire to study the philosophical aspects of the new Communist trend were less naïve; they seemed to do most of their studying in night clubs and bars, accompanied by as many Balkan beauties as their government grants would attract.

The Yugoslavs will consider these incidental expenses worthwhile if their over-all plan succeeds. The seven-man secretariat and the thirty-man Continuation Committee now have before them the task of preparing a larger conference, tentatively scheduled for Paris in 1952. Their main problem will



be to get support from the democratic mass organizations of Europe and America, many of which do not see any fundamental changes in Yugoslav society since the break with the Cominform.

The Peasants' Victory

The Yugoslavs themselves know perfectly well that not all vestiges of Stalinism have disappeared: The frontiers are still closed to most Yugoslavs, bureaucracy is still alive, and there is no Opposition press. But there have been changes, and the Yugoslavs hope that their recent visitors noticed them.

The most striking changes are the new economic measures which are gradually being put into effect. In essence, and as Tito has practically admitted, the new economic policy marks the victory of the peasants over the government. Having failed in his efforts to force the peasants to put their produce on the market, Tito is now going to give more money to the industrial workers and let them bargain directly with the peasants.

Up to now, the peasant has been the main beneficiary of the scarcity of consumer goods. He alone has had money to buy what was available. A familiar sight on the streets of Belgrade is an ox-drawn cart from the Serbian plain being loaded with pianos and antiques that the middle class has had to sell and that the working class is too poor to buy. The peasant, who has resisted both coaxing and threats in refusing to join the co-operatives, is rich. He keeps his wealth in goods rather than in cash, anticipating a monetary reform and devaluation—something which economists have frequently predicted.

The co-operatives, which were to become the main support of Yugoslav agriculture, have not been a success. They cover only about twenty-five per cent of the arable land, and their production is not—except for a few model farms into which large sums have been poured by the government—an improvement over that of individual farmers.

Western economists familiar with conditions in Yugoslavia claim that the failure of the co-operative system is mainly due to the size of the units, which sometimes include as many as 120 families. The farmers themselves say that the stumbling block is lack of adequate machinery, especially trac-



tors. Both explanations could be correct. Large co-operatives can scarcely be profitable if they merely employ primitive agricultural methods on a large scale. A drive through the Serbian farmland shows how primitive agriculture still is in Yugoslavia. Even on the largest co-operative farms, the farmer walks slowly with an iron plow (which only scratches the surface) behind slow oxen.

Bureaucracy's Skeletons

To buy the machinery that is needed, Yugoslavia must export. But its export figures today are only seventy-five per cent of what they were in prewar years, although over-all production is considerably higher. This deficit in exports is mainly the result of a plan, conceived in 1947, which seems now to have been too ambitious. To industrialize the country, the government decided to invest a large proportion of the national income in production of capital goods such as hydroelectric stations and machine tools. Although correct figures on this investment are difficult to obtain, about thirty per cent (some say even thirty-seven) of the national income was taken away from the consumer and given to the plan. Added to this, staggering government expenditures, required for the maintenance of strong armed forces, made it inevitable that only a small fraction of the national wealth would reach the consumer in the form of goods.

Even with this large investment, the plan did not succeed. Out of a projected thirty-one hydroelectric stations, only one has been completed. Machinery for four cotton factories has been delivered by Great Britain, but there are no buildings to house it and no skilled labor to operate it. On the north bank of the Sava River, the city of New Belgrade, where Tito planned to establish the seat of his government, is sinking into the wet sand. The skeletons of steel and cement, which were

to be the government buildings, have been left unfinished and abandoned for reasons of economy. Yugoslavs refer to them frequently as "the monuments of our bureaucracy."

Another blow to bureaucracy has been the gradual abolition of special privileges for government workers, who used to receive coupons that allowed them to buy merchandise for twenty per cent of the list price.

A considerably larger portion of the national income is to be spent henceforth for consumer goods, many of which will have to be imported. Items such as razor blades and combs, now exceedingly hard to get, are to become available. A Swedish concern has just sold five million cheap razor blades to Yugoslavia.

Official government publications stress decentralization. From now on, they say, planning will not be done from above but will be largely left to individuals. Popular demand and the quality and diversity of goods are to be taken into account.

The suspicions of the peasants and the resentment of those who had enjoyed special privileges will certainly make the changes difficult. Personal incomes have risen, but prices have, too. In the last days of October the price of railway, plane, and riverboat tickets jumped three hundred to four hundred per cent.

Theater and movie tickets went up at about the same rate. The rise in transportation costs, incidentally, is having profound social consequences. The extremely cheap rates which prevailed before the recent increases had, as one French journalist put it, given the whole nation *la bougeotte ferroviaire* (railroad wanderlust). For the slightest reason, people got on the trains and traveled for hundreds of miles. The price of transportation, like that of entertainment, did not correspond to the service rendered, and the state made up the deficit. Now that attempts are being made to put the transportation and entertainment industries on a sound economic basis, the trains carry fewer passengers and the Belgrade Opera House is almost empty.

Largesse to Students

Student allowances will be raised, but actually the students will be able to buy less rather than more. Before the increase a student received 2,000 dinars

a month as a grant from the government and could live in a student home where he paid only 1,500 dinars for his room and board. Now his allowance will be raised to 3,000 dinars a month, but he will be obliged to pay the student home 3,500 dinars for his keep.

CARE and Sartre

The secretary of the student association, who had to explain to his fellow students that all this was necessary for the development of the new socialist state and should be accepted whole-heartedly, receives a salary of 6,500 dinars a month in his official capacity. There has been some murmuring about him in the ranks of the students. The very fact that they can now hope that their complaints will be listened to shows, according to some, that "the dictatorship of the secretariat," as the Stalinist state apparatus has been called, is beginning to wither away in Yugoslavia.

In the last two years, the people of

Yugoslavia have been given a glimpse of the "capitalist monster" they had previously been taught to hate. British, American, and French information offices are crowded. People from all walks of life come to see pictures, to read news bulletins (in Serbo-Croat, English, and French), and to look at the newspapers and magazines. Two plays by Jean-Paul Sartre have just been translated, and they are best-sellers.

Yugoslavs have been impressed by American generosity. For weeks last winter, one Communist told me, large sections of the population were able to survive only because of CARE. On many tables the only fat available was CARE fat, the only meat CARE meat, the only sugar CARE sugar. CARE has probably done more to promote the United States in Yugoslavia than any other single effort. Everything American has an almost magic appeal in Yugoslavia. American-made headache tablets are believed to produce imme-

diate and wonderful cures for almost any ailment.

Conversely, Russian popularity has fallen off sharply. In Belgrade, where most of the Serbs understand Russian perfectly, an American reporter asked a passer-by, in Russian, how to get to a certain place in the city; he was deliberately sent in the opposite direction.

Wreaths and Weeds

There are many Russian soldiers' graves in the parks and squares of Belgrade. These were the men of the Fourth Ukrainian Army, which, in conjunction with partisan forces, ousted the Germans from the capital in October, 1944. Until 1948, fresh flowers were placed on these graves regularly by party organizations and even by individuals who wanted to express their thanks to "the liberators." Now weeds cover the graves. Here and there the rusted wires of an old wreath can be seen. Nobody stops to look at the little monuments of red stone any more.

Greece—Back from the Abyss

A close election has given it a liberal Government; political miracles may give it lasting reforms

MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM

BROADCASTING from Bucharest, the Greek Communist radio has denounced the recently formed Government of General Nicholas Plastiras as a "monarcho-fascist" tool of American imperialism. At the same time, Greek right-wing newspapers have heaped execrations on it as a Government of fellow travelers which endangers the security of the nation.

If one allows for the semantics of Greek politics—which are not, perhaps, so different from those of politics in countries nearer home—there is a factual basis for both charges. Plastiras is undoubtedly pro-American, and if

he is not endangering the security of Greece, at least he is endangering the security of Greek special privilege. There can be little doubt that in both respects his Government represents the will of a substantial majority of the Greek people.

When the Greeks went to the polls on September 9, 1951, sixty per cent of them voted for parties which had not been in existence two years previously. The largest single number of ballots—36.4 per cent of the total—went to the Greek Rally of Field Marshal Alexander Papagos, which had just been formed at the end of July. The

E.P.E.K. (National Progressive Union of the Center), formed by General Plastiras shortly before the elections of March, 1950, ran second with 23.5 per cent.

Papagos, aside from a short period as Minister of War under the dictatorship which restored the monarchy in 1935, had not previously played an active role in Greek politics, although rightist elements had been seeking to use him as a front for some time. As Commander in Chief he had earned wide respect by introducing much-needed reforms and remedying some of the corruption and political favoritism


which had previously crippled the Greek Army in its war against the Communist guerrillas. His active entry into politics took place after he had resigned his post in protest at palace intrigues against him and found the other political parties—which feared him as a potential rival—lined up solidly in support of the king.

Plastiras, on the other hand, has long been a symbol of radical republicanism (although he has now made his peace with the throne, and the monarchy is not an issue in Greek politics at present). He first appeared on the political scene in 1922, when he rallied the remnants of the Greek Army which had been defeated in Asia Minor by the Turks. With them he overthrew the royalist Government then in power and had several of its members court-martialed and shot. In recent years his radicalism, originally purely political in character, has taken on an increasing social and economic content.

Plastiras's present Cabinet is a coalition between E.P.E.K. and the Liberal Party of Sophocles Venizelos, which received 19.5 per cent of the vote. The Liberals, like E.P.E.K., claim descent from the party of Eleutherios Venizelos, whose shadow still dominates Greek politics fifteen years after his death in exile. Indeed, it is the magic of the Venizelos name—particularly in the elder Venizelos's native island of Crete—which saved the Liberals from the disaster which overtook their traditional rivals, the Populist Party of Constantine Tsaldaris. In the mass rebellion against the “traditional” parties this rightist group, which had an absolute majority in 1946 (when the Left and part of the Center boycotted the elections) and was still the largest party in March, 1950, fell to 6.5 per cent of the vote and two seats out of 258.

Apparent Unanimity

Both Papagos and Plastiras emphasized in their programs the demand for a change, and the changes they called for were in large part identical: more efficient use of American aid, increased honesty and efficiency in the civil service, a shifting of the burden of sacrifice from those who could not afford it to those who could—all these were to be found in both programs. Even Plastiras's demand for widespread amnesties of political prisoners, which was hysterically denounced by the rightist



Harris & Ewing

Nicholas Plastiras

press, had its counterpart in Papagos's call for “forgetfulness of the past.” (But now Papagos opposes the moderate amnesty measures actually proposed by the new Government.) On all these points the program of the Liberal Party was similar—except that instead of demanding a change, it maintained, not without some basis in fact, that as the principal governing party of the previous year it had taken steps toward the introduction of the reforms in question.

Of course this apparent agreement was not altogether real. Many, probably most, of those who supported Papagos were voting for him not because they believed his promises of reform but because they did not. Certainly this was true of the fascists and collaborators clustered around the newspaper *Ethnikos Kyri* (which once referred to a Chicago *Tribune* correspondent as “obviously a Communist or fellow traveler”), and of most of the financial interests which backed Papagos. It was true, too, of the reactionary politicians who played a prominent role on his list of candidates, and who had consistently defended the vested interests which reform would threaten. At least eighty-two of the 114 members of Parliament who supported Papagos had been candidates in the 1950 election, a large majority of them on the tickets of rightist or fascist parties.

Yet there is good reason to believe

that at least Papagos and his principal adviser, Spiros Markezinis, took their program seriously, and certainly many of the votes cast for the Greek Rally were votes for a drastic alteration of Greek political and economic life. It is also certainly true that all three major political parties recognize that few reforms can be carried through without American approval, or avoided in the face of American insistence. If we were actually as active in determining Greek policy as most Greeks think we are, this would mean that on paper all Governments would produce similar policies—though their execution would be something else again. Since in fact we are hesitant to veto and even more hesitant to demand, the actual difference between the policies of a Plastiras-Venizelos Government and those which might be expected from one headed by Marshal Papagos are substantial. And the reforms which Greece needs are more likely to come from the former.

Justice Returns

The program of the new Government in the field of internal pacification represents a compromise between the views of Plastiras and his Liberal Party allies—although the basic differences between the two are not so great as political considerations have sometimes made them appear. While it will not carry out Plastiras's proposal to release all persons imprisoned without trial, it will abolish concentration camps and substitute exile to inhabited islands.

About half of all remaining political prisoners are to be freed in the next few months, thus reducing the total to less than a third of what it was two years ago, when in proportion to population it was comparable to that in Hitler's Germany. The normal processes of justice are being substituted for the special courts-martial which have had jurisdiction over political offenses and have exercised that jurisdiction according to their own peculiar lights.

One court-martial early in 1951, when the passage of a year since the end of the civil war had contributed substantially to the development of a freer atmosphere, requested Parliament to lift the immunity of two Deputies so that it could try them for criticizing a government decree limiting the freedom of the press. This was too much for even the most reactionary Deputies to stomach, and the request was rejected

by a unanimous vote of Parliament. In other cases the personal intervention of Papagos as Commander in Chief was necessary to block the use of the courts-martial as rightist instruments against the non-Communist Left and Center.

Assault on the Oligarchy

The Plastiras Government has made a bold beginning in the direction of economic and fiscal reform by calling in Kyriakos Varvaressos as its economic adviser. As Finance Minister in the Voulgaris Government of 1945, Varvaressos made a frontal assault on what Greeks are accustomed to call "the oligarchy," and temporarily succeeded in loosening its grip on the Greek economy. However, he had at that time no real political force to back him. Elections had not been held since back in 1936; the aftermath of the E.A.M. revolt of December, 1944, had been a state of anarchy throughout large parts of the country, with Communist bands in some areas and right-wing gangs in others negating the authority of the central government, with the police and armed forces degenerating into party instruments, and with the normal processes of production largely paralyzed. Hence the economic pirates on whose toes Varvaressos stepped were able to beat him by combining economic pressure with a campaign of vilification in the press. Attacked from both Right and Left, he was driven from office and went to work at the International Bank in Washington.

Varvaressos will still face the combined opposition of the Communists and of entrenched capital supported by a number of venal newspapers. The harm which the Communists can do, no matter how much they denounce him as an agent of Wall Street, is today very limited. And he will be supported by a Government with a parliamentary majority behind it and by the ECA mission, at least to some extent. Some fur is likely to fly—and this time more of it will probably come from the "oligarchy" than from Varvaressos.

Absentee Assets

But with the best will in the world, the Government is severely limited in what it can do. For the unfortunate fact is that the resources which could contribute most to making Greece self-supporting are largely beyond its reach.

Greek shipping is managed, for the most part, from New York and London, where many leading shipowners make their permanent residence. It seldom touches Greek ports, and much of it is even under the flag of Panama. Rarely indeed do any of the profits from it find their way into the national balance of payments; instead, they end up in bank accounts in New York, London, and Zürich.

Even the shipowners who were set up in business after the war with American ships, under bills of sale which prevented them from transferring their tonnage to Panamanian registry, quickly went far into arrears on their taxes. It was only by ordering Greek consuls throughout the world to refuse clearance papers to ships belonging to such owners that the short-lived Plastiras Government of 1950 finally forced them to make a small contribution to the national economy.

Plugging the Holes

An even worse situation exists with regard to the income from the very substantial Greek investments abroad. In general, records of these investments don't even exist; most of the income is spent or reinvested abroad and almost never visits Greece en route. And the remittances from Greeks abroad, which before the war played a very important role in Greece's balance of payments, now move chiefly through the black market and serve as one of

the channels for the thriving illicit export of capital.

If all these sources of foreign exchange could be fully exploited, Greece's deficit could be materially reduced. Yet even then it is doubtful if Greece would be self-supporting on the basis of its present natural and industrial resources and its present standard of living, which, for the mass of the people, is the lowest in any Marshall Plan country outside the Iberian Peninsula. At no time since it attained its independence in 1830 has Greece existed without foreign subsidies either in the form of nominal loans or outright gifts.

There is not the slightest chance that more than a part of privately held Greek assets abroad can be brought into the service of Greece by all the steps which any Government can take, even with the co-operation of the United States and Great Britain. But if a fundamental solution of Greece's economic problems cannot be attained even through the most efficient mobilization of its citizens' external resources than now appears feasible, at least some alleviation of them can be secured in this direction. Whether it is attained depends partly on the continuation in office of a Greek Government that is at least capable of attempting reform, and partly on the co-operation of Greece's foreign friends.

Industry and Farming

Greece's domestic resources are very limited indeed. Although it is primarily an agricultural country, destruction of forests and abuse of the soil over a period of two thousand years have reduced most of the country's surface to bare rock. Denudation of the mountains has created a perpetual water problem, so that even where there is soil it often remains barren because neither rain nor irrigation is available. Nor are Greece's developed mineral resources very large.

Greek industry is small-scale. Because of this and the need to import most raw materials, it is very high-cost. Hence the only export markets in which it stands any competitive chance are the poverty-stricken ones of the Middle East, where it gains some protection from western competition by virtue of a transportation differential.

In all these fields ECA has done valuable work. Some spectacular land-rec-



Harris & Ewing

Constantine Tsaldaris

lamation projects have been carried out under the direction of Walter Packard of its agricultural division. The geologist George Heikes, former head of the ECA mining section in Greece, carried out investigations which have already opened up some new sources of mineral wealth and bid fair to lead to others. But land reclamation can at best only decrease Greece's need for food imports, not eliminate it. Even the most optimistic estimates of the eventual yield from all Greece's mineral resources come to only about a third of the present deficit in the balance of payments.

Greek industrial development remains sharply limited in potential by the basic shortage of power sources, which the ECA-aided hydroelectric and lignite programs can alleviate but not eliminate; by the need to import raw materials; and by the difficulties in either producing for a domestic market of eight million people, most of whom have an income level which scarcely makes them very good potential customers, or for a world market already crowded with more efficient competitors.

Better use of those resources that Greece does have can nevertheless result in some improvement in the standard of living of the Greek workers and peasants. To a small extent, this can be achieved by a shift of foreign exchange from luxury imports to necessities, though since Greece's own exports are almost entirely in the luxury category it must accept some luxuries in return.

Housing

A more important improvement can be effected in the field of housing, where standards can be raised very substantially without much use of imported resources. So far, government and ECA aid have been confined almost entirely to the rehousing of refugees. Important as this has been, it has done nothing to satisfy the needs of the wretchedly housed city workers, who have seen privately financed luxury housing going up in the Athens area at a rate which for some time exceeded the total of reconstruction expenditures for all Greece. ECA officials repeatedly attempted to induce the Greek Government to check this luxury construction, which was as harmful psychologically as it was economically.

Finally, the Venizelos-Papandreu



Harris & Ewing
Alexander Papagos

government early in 1951 suddenly issued a directive revoking all construction licenses. Whether this was merely heavy-handed blundering or whether it represented an intentional effort on somebody's part to produce a public reaction against the ECA demands, it did result in an immediate outcry. As had happened only too often, ECA had not made its own position adequately clear to the Greek people, for fear of seeming to go over the Government's head. But if the order was a planned maneuver, it did not succeed entirely, since the Government eventually did adopt a new set of regulations calculated to discourage luxury housing while permitting moderate-priced construction to continue.

Rationing Without Rations

Rationing and controls can also help to redirect Greek resources from the hands of those who need them least to those who need them most. At present, this is almost a virgin field. A so-called rationing program has indeed recently been begun, after more than a year of delay. This program does not actually attempt to ration anything; rather, it is based on making a limited quantity of certain basic commodities available to the public at fixed prices. Intended to cover a total of about 1,100 calories a day per capita, it is still far short of reaching this goal. It is too early to judge the extent to which it will

help the average Greek worker—but the promise of it served for a long time as an excuse for following a wage-freezing policy while prices continued to rise.

The wage-price policies sponsored by ECA and carried out by successive Greek Governments have, from the point of view of the Greek workers, been anything but a success. Neither wage controls nor price controls have been completely enforceable. But price increases above ceilings have been general even where ceilings existed, and the removal of many commodities from control was to a large extent only a recognition that it is difficult to enforce ceilings in the face of shortages.

Since Greece suffers both from serious chronic unemployment and underemployment, wage ceilings have been largely self-enforcing except in the case of a few categories of skilled workers. Only in a few industries have trade unions been strong enough to maintain the relative economic position of their members; government interference with collective bargaining and even internal union administration has been common enough under laws remaining from the Metaxas dictatorship and the various quisling Governments, as well as those promulgated during the post-war unrest. To a large extent these restrictions have been relaxed in the last two years, and many Greek unions today operate under standards as high as those anywhere.

But the Plastiras Government still has scope for a good deal of constructive activity in carrying out its pledge to "safeguard the trade-union freedoms of the workers." Perhaps the most important single contribution it can make here is to abolish the system under which the Government collects compulsory dues of about thirteen cents a month from every worker in Greece, unionized or not, and turns it over partly to the General Confederation of Labor and partly to the various local labor centers and local unions. This system, of course, helps to discourage genuine unionism, since it means that

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the top union leaders have an assured income irrespective of what they may or may not do in the way of organizing the workers or serving their interests. At the same time it makes it difficult to introduce an efficient voluntary dues system on a scale high enough to permit genuine trade-union work. (Some of the better Greek unions do have voluntary dues in addition to the government levy.) This reform was requested by the Tenth Panhellenic Labor Congress a year ago, with January 1, 1952, as the date for its inception.

Is It Worth It?

It is easy to understand, in view of the poverty of Greece's resources and the corruption and rapacity of many of those who have controlled its destinies in recent years, why an American in ECA once threw up his hands and asked: "What have the Russians ever done for us that we should keep them out of this country?"

Yet if we cannot hope, in the course of the next few years, to solve the prob-

lem of making a country support eight million people when its resources are only adequate to give a satisfactory standard of living to half that number, we can at least do something to improve the lot of the ordinary people of Greece. These ordinary people are our allies in a very fundamental sense, as they have proved by clinging to and fighting for democracy in the face of assaults from totalitarians of the Left and Right, and in spite of economic misery and years of terror and counter-terror. Today they have won their way back, with our help, from the edge of a precipice. They have a government which, if not perfect, will still bear comparison with most of the governments of the free world, and may be expected at least to try to solve the problems before it in the spirit of political and economic democracy. The degree of its success will depend largely on the extent to which we are ready to help.

Our help must be of many sorts—technical advice, political support for the progressive forces in Greece, aid

in the mobilization of privately held Greek resources which are beyond the reach of the Greek Government but not beyond ours, and continued economic aid. And that economic assistance should be so apportioned that the ordinary Greek worker and peasant will feel its benefits immediately, in the form of an increase in real income. For so far we have had his support largely on faith—that faith in the American dream that ordinary people the world over have so long had. But even the strongest faith cannot survive indefinitely in the face of a falling real income. And despite Greece's lack of economic importance, despite the fact that the Greek mainland is an exposed salient indefensible in a general war, the political success of our policy in Greece remains a crucial test of our ability to defend democracy in the world today. It is because of this, and because we owe it to the ordinary Greek people who have given us their friendship and their trust, that we are in Greece and that we must stay there.

European vs. U. S. Industrialists

When representatives of both groups met recently in New York, the subject of productivity came in for a rousing discussion

UGO STILLE

THE NAM GOES INTERNATIONAL, a business magazine headlined the conference on industrial productivity held by four hundred European and American industrialists at the Hotel Pierre in New York early in December. This did not imply that the conference in question was a kind of antipasto of European delicacies that preceded the meat and potatoes of the N.A.M.'s main meeting, which featured home-cooked protests against the controls administered by the Messrs. DiSalle and Fleischmann. A more exact description of the Pierre conference was

given by a shrewd industrialist from northern Italy. "This is not a convention," he said. "It's a trial, and the defendant is European capitalism."

Officially the meeting was the last lap of an elaborate junket arranged jointly by the ECA and the N.A.M. Its purpose was "to quicken the exchange of experience and know-how" and thus to contribute to the defense of the free world. ECA organized the Europeans' first two weeks in the United States into what it called Operation IMPACT, involving conducted tours of U.S. industrial centers by 284 business leaders

from sixteen Marshall Plan countries, representing 340 corporations with an aggregate worth of \$7 billion. Operation IMPACT was carried out with timetable precision and wrapped in military-communiqué phraseology: "Today seventy-two industrialists converge on New York. Tomorrow the second wave."

On arrival, most members of Europe's industrial aristocracy received an itinerary, a map of the New York subway system, a booklet on how to handle the American press, and twelve dollars—ECA's standard daily expense



allowance for students and workers invited from abroad. Some of the European businessmen scorned such petty cash, and one said it would not cover his daily tips to cab-drivers. But the delegates from such countries as Britain, whose governments apply more rigid currency controls, had previously made it clear that without such an allowance they couldn't afford the trip.

N.A.M.'s About-Face

The motives behind Operation IMPACT were obvious. Without greater output, not only will the goals of Eisenhower's European rearmament program be unattainable, but even halfhearted efforts to achieve it will lead to economic and political crisis. The new ECA line was publicly stated in August by William Joyce, assistant administrator of ECA, in a speech criticizing the "feudalistic" attitude of some sections of French and Italian industry and advocating reforms of that "mixture of corporatism, statism and cartelism that in Europe goes under the name of capitalism."

N.A.M.'s part in the project was less clear. When ECA first came out with its new policy, N.A.M. was as suspicious and critical as it usually is of "bureaucratic" ideas. Then there was a sudden change of heart. It seems to have been brought about both by the desire to keep the ECA plan within the limits of pure free enterprise and by the



growing realization in the American business community that, as one of its members recently put it, "America is in the twentieth century, while in Europe many things are hangovers from the nineteenth and previous centuries."

The European industrialists were well aware of this American state of mind, and the atmosphere in which the conference opened was one of tension feebly disguised by tact.

A few days previously, one of the European delegates had appeared on



the "Town Meeting of the Air" radio program. The moderator, George Denby, greeted him with the words: "I am happy to welcome tonight one of the Henry Fords of Europe," and thereby touched almost the sorest spot possible. The accusation against European industrial leaders has been precisely that they are *not* Henry Fords, because they do not subscribe to Ford's philosophy of mass production for an expanding market. The issue was squarely put by Paul Hoffman in the opening speech. Fifty years ago, he pointed out, the United States and western Europe had approximately the same rate of productivity; today the United States, with a population of 150 million, produces \$300 billion worth of goods annually, while western Europe, with 275 million people, produces barely \$160 billion.

Thus the stage seemed to be set for a clear-cut conflict between U.S.-model capitalism, featuring an expanding


economy, low costs, high wages, and constantly increasing mass purchasing power, and European-model capitalism, featuring an overprotected economy, low wages, and high prices as the means to maximum profits. Cartels were naturally the villains of the show, and even Hoffman's euphemistic contrast between "the highly civilized form of competition that prevails in [Europe]" and "the very uncomfortable [American] competition" seemed only to add a note of irony.

The Europeans rallied to the defense around the theme "difference of environments." The most uneasy were the French. On the first day of the conference, after Charles E. Wilson of General Motors referred to the death of colonialism, they circulated a resolution to fight the "dangerous" anti-colonialism of those people in the United States who, "guided by respect for individual liberty at the expense of their own interests, do not seem to understand that the natives are incapable of governing themselves." Not enough support could be marshaled to bring the resolution to the floor. The Belgians had agreed, but the Dutch refused, asking, in effect, "What's the use of crying over spilt milk? We have already lost our colonies."

A Frenchman Speaks Out

On the issue of cartels the French were even more uneasy. Their principal spokesman, Pierre Ricard, began his





speech quietly and philosophically with a quotation from Henri Bergson: "Freedom is the greatest source of energy, provided that individual wills conform to the common aim"—this common aim being the *ententes professionnelles* which ECA criticizes so much as obstacles to increased production.

Sensing that this line was not exactly sweeping the Americans off their feet, Ricard put aside his prepared speech for "a few frank words to our American friends." What he said next had the flavor of a campaign speech rather than a technical analysis: Americans, he said, should come down from their lofty abstract theories, which are apt to be ruinously naïve, and have a closer look at the reality of European situations. They would then realize that American methods, though admirable in theory, simply could not be indiscriminately applied in Europe, and that certain European practices which Americans criticize contribute to the stability of the continent. He hinted that Europeans were also aware that U.S. businessmen do not always abstain from these same practices.

The Ricard speech brought down the house. "He finally said what we all thought!" cried an Italian businessman. "He had the guts to tell them." And from that moment the atmosphere became more serene. The impromptu speech provided an outlet for the feeling of frustration that the Europeans had previously expressed only in corridor gossip: "They will find out where all this demagogic talk about high wages will lead them." "Don't 'they' realize that we know how they fix prices? I've been in Pittsburgh and I know about the quiet get-togethers at the steel manufacturers' club." "All this talk about paying taxes—look at the scandals in today's paper! After all, it's the same everywhere."

The conference ended in agreement on the need for a "productivity mani-

fest" that should be, though delayed 104 years, an answer to that of Marx and Engels, a kind of "Capitalists of all countries, unite!"—under the banner of efficient production and socially conscious management.

After Manifestoes, What?

What did the get-together accomplish? Its main defect was the emphasis on general principles rather than concrete cases. But, aside from the inevitable slogans and catchwords, the three days of "quick meals and long speeches" served to clarify the problem. Nobody questioned the basic premise: the need for an increase in Europe's productivity. The position of the Europeans has been "yes, but." Analysis of the "but" has brought to the surface the real difficulty.


Clearly it is not a simple question of technological or organizational improvement of European industry. Some of the speakers referred to Europe's uncertain supply of raw materials and to scarcity of investment capital. These difficulties are undoubtedly grave and real. Just as grave and real are the particular problems of individual countries, like the chronic unemployment that slows down industrial development in Italy and the high taxation that seems to discourage private industrial investments in Great Britain. Without minimizing these, the realization emerged that the shift from a re-

strictive economy to an expanding economy in Europe is possible only with the psychological security of a permanently enlarged market. Here we arrive at the vicious circle of the whole European problem.

Two years ago, ECA had already come to a sound diagnosis of Europe's trouble. At the close of the "first-aid" stage of ECA activity, Paul Hoffman insisted on the need for the economic integration of Europe, the "horizontal widening" of the market in order to stimulate production. (He saw the possibility of a production increase of \$100 billion in a few years.) Hoffman's original project has had to be watered down considerably. European Governments answered his appeals by stating that decisive steps toward integration must wait until their national industries grew strong enough to brave the fresh air of unlimited competition.

ECA's new productivity drive is an attempt to achieve the same end the other way round. The new emphasis is on vertical rather than horizontal expansion of the European market, on increasing the purchasing power of the masses through production at lower costs and higher wages. Therefore, the object of ECA pressures is the production policies of individual industrial units rather than the trade policies of Governments. But just as in 1949 the European Governments cited the weak position of their industries as the obstacle to accepting the ECA line, today the European industrialists point to their Governments' policies as the obstacle: "We cannot expand production without the economic integration of Europe, a currency convertibility, a breaking down of trade barriers."

It now appears clear that without a new push toward the economic integration of Europe along the lines of Paul Hoffman's program in 1949, the 1952 productivity drive of ECA will get nowhere.



An Army with Wings

Combat units that will reach overseas objectives in hours instead of weeks are becoming more and more possible

JOHN B. SPORE

THE LANDING of American troops in Iceland last summer had a significance to military men beyond the strategic fact that the United States was preparing, as it had been ten years earlier, to defend that key North Atlantic outpost from attack from the east. Ten years ago Major General Charles H. Bonesteel's force was transported to Iceland in a large convoy protected by U.S. and British warships. This time Brigadier General E. J. McGaw's force flew nonstop from an American base to Keflavik airport in Iceland.

Logistical Millennium

Some professional soldiers consider the flight important new evidence, coming as it does after the Berlin airlift and extensive Korean experience, that massive airborne operations will become almost commonplace should global war come again.

In the flight to Iceland certain vital factors were missing. The force was composed almost entirely of nonparatroopers. There was a modern landing field for the incoming planes. No enemy sought to impede the landing. In many ways it differed not at all from the regularly scheduled flights of transoceanic commercial airlines. But one paratrooper colonel who made the flight wrote back to the States that the experience had convinced him more than ever that the future of ground combat lies in air transportation.

"If we had had the right kind of planes and if our force had been all paratroopers, we could have jumped and captured that airstrip and secured Iceland," he wrote. "I was impressed as those big planes rolled in loaded with everything we needed—from chow to 2½-ton trucks. And this was no short hop either, like from Frankfurt to Berlin, or Japan to Korea. It was trans-



oceanic. That's the significant thing."

The key to this statement was "the right kind of planes." The potentialities of airborne operations are well understood and accepted today, but armies cannot yet move entirely by air, in spite of the colonel's enthusiasm. The right kind of planes must be designed and built in quantity, and Army weapons and equipment must be redesigned and modified for air transportability. Much has been done, but much remains to be done. In the logistical millennium, armies will be free of the ancient limitations imposed by mountains, rivers, jungles, deserts, oceans, and inadequate roads. They will be able to strike anywhere on the face of the globe.

In Korea

The aircraft used by the air-transported armies of the future will range from long-distance troop- and tank-carrying planes to helicopters or the revolutionary convertiplane—not yet beyond the laboratory stage—designed

to land and take off like a helicopter but to fly with the speed of a conventional fixed-wing airplane.

In Korea, helicopters and light planes have done many tasks usually performed by jeeps and larger trucks—or by men in terrain where trucks cannot operate. Larger aircraft—two- and four-engined cargo planes of the Second World War, and the Fairchild C-82 and C-119, designed and built for the transportation of paratroopers and their equipment—are air-dropping food and medical supplies, 4,500-pound steel bridge sections, and 105-mm. howitzers. These planes are vital to the combat efficiency and sustenance of the Eighth Army, for Korea is a mountainous peninsula with primitive roads. Our losses in Korea doubtless would be far larger without these planes to fly supplies to surrounded units and to evacuate wounded. But the total tonnage of supplies carried by aircraft in Korea is just a trickle compared to the total consumption.

Until we get more planes specifically designed for the work, and many more of them, an army substantially smaller than the Eighth could not exist by aerial resupply alone. It has been figured that to lift a present-day infantry division with three days' supplies (omitting tanks and other heavy equip-





Experimental light infantry carrier

ment that cannot now be airlifted) would take about 1,350 medium cargo aircraft (eight-ton payload) and 160 heavy cargo aircraft (twenty-five-ton payload). The Air Force does not have that many planes of these types. Commercial airliners can be used, but they are not suitable. On many of them the doors and cargo compartments are too small and too high off the ground, so that fork-lift trucks or hand labor is required to load and unload them. Faster loading and unloading can be accomplished through clamshell doors in the back of the fuselage, which drop to provide a ramp to the ground.

Chutes and 'Assault Transports'

As airplanes become faster and heavier, they require harder-surfaced, longer runways. Building such landing strips behind an advancing army is costly in time, material, and manpower. One way to get around this is to parachute equipment. Great advances have been made in this field since 1945. The 105-mm. howitzer, weighing about two and a half tons, has been chuted so many times that the feat is now standardized. The same is true of the jeep. The development of new parachutes for heavy drops suggests that the air drop of a light tank may be possible—when an airplane appears that can carry it and is suitable to drop it from. But airborne men say that the air-dropping of equipment is uneconomical—that it is a transitional pro-

cedure that would eventually be used only in extremities or in support of the paratroops who would form the spearhead of an invading airborne army. For one thing, the recovery of air-dropped equipment is costly in manpower needed to battle the enemy.

The Army has long seen a need for "assault transports" capable of carrying a respectable payload that can land on an improvised airstrip such as a country road, a sandy beach, or a meadow. Through its efforts the Air Force recently placed an order for a number of Chase C-123s, a plane of eight-ton capacity that in exhaustive tests proved itself rugged enough to perform this type of work. The C-123 has a somewhat surprising history. It began as one of the cargo gliders used in the Second World War. After the war the manufacturer made minor modifications and added two aircraft engines. Tests proved it a durable, economical cargo carrier. The Chase C-123 carries the same load as the larger of the two Fairchild cargo planes and does it much more economically, Army airborne men say. They have high hopes that this feature will induce commercial air-freight carriers to order it in quantity, thus increasing the number available in an emergency.

Clamshells and Pods

The Douglas C-124, which can carry up to 50,000 pounds, has the clamshell doors that make it possible to load a

light tank. However, the plane's tremendous weight and size require a lengthy landing strip that would rarely be available close to the front lines.

Another development is the detachable cargo compartment called the "pod." Fairchild has built a pod plane, the XC-120, which is now being tested by the Air Force and Army. The objective is to produce an airplane that can pick up a loaded fuselage, fly it to its destination, and then hook onto another fuselage which it will fly back. It will operate like the tractor-trailer combinations so common on American highways.

The military possibilities of the pod plane are intriguing. A communications center containing radios and other signal equipment could be set up in one and flown to the desired location, where it would go into action housed in the pod. It might be used for small field-hospital wards, mobile command posts, and many other purposes. Tractors could tow loaded pods from the landing strip to nearby supply dumps and distributing points. Obviously, the pod plane requires a modern landing strip. It has been suggested that the plane might fly very low over an improvised strip or field, detach the pod in flight, and let it skid to a landing like a glider. Another suggestion is that the pod be released by a parachute-rocket combination. The parachute would control the fall of the pod, and the rockets, set to go off before it landed, would break the final impact.

The Piasecki Helicopter Corporation has designed a helicopter that will also carry a detachable pod. If and when it is built, it will be larger and have more capacity than any helicopter now flying.

Helicopters and Convertiplanes

Valuable as helicopters are in evacuating wounded men, bringing up ammunition or hot food, in directing and controlling artillery fire, laying communications wire, and in scouting the enemy, they simply do not have enough capacity as cargo carriers. Nevertheless, the Army is going in hard for helicopters. Pilots are being trained at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Army helicopter-transport companies are being organized. As presently used, helicopters supplement jeep and light-truck transportation. Their advantages are obvious. They do not require an im-

proved landing strip. They can hop over rivers, mountains, and swamps, and fly wherever men can fight.

The helicopter industry largely developed from the ardent enthusiasm of a few amateurs. In the past several years trained and educated aeronautical engineers have entered the field, and helicopter developments are being speeded up. One of the reasons why helicopters are still so small, Army airborne men say, is that no engine has ever been developed specifically for a helicopter.

If successful, the convertiplane may eventually replace both helicopter and fixed-wing transports for Army use. In theory it is a craft that would do the job of both. It would have hovering characteristics similar to the helicopter's. Once it was airborne, the windmill-like propellers that lifted it would be locked into place and serve as a wing while other engines would provide the power for flight speeds and ranges comparable to those of fixed-wing aircraft.

Jettisoning Weight

The design and production in quantity of the right kind of aircraft is only part

of the problem. Much can be done by the Army itself in reducing the weight and size of its equipment. It is in this field that the work of the Joint Airborne Troop Board, a developmental agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, becomes significant. Major General William M. Miley, the director of the board, holds that the eventual air transportability of the Army is possible only if the idea of true mobility pervades every echelon and every branch. Unfortunately, in defiance of this concept and of the lessons of the Second World War, the trend in some instances is directly counter to developing lighter weapons and equipment by redesign, stripping off unessential parts and gadgets, and the use of lightweight metals.

Two prime examples of this inconsistency are displayed in the jeep and 2½-ton truck now being issued by Ordnance. The jeep has been increased in weight by three or four hundred pounds and the 2½-ton-capacity truck by a ton. General Miley can't understand why it should take a seven-ton vehicle (the weight of the 2½-ton truck) to carry 2½ tons when "by the

use of unconventional design and light metals a vehicle weighing 2½ tons can be built that will carry 2½ tons."

The increase in weight in the jeep is as distressing. Originally developed as a weapons carrier for the infantry, it became an all-purpose vehicle used by headquarters clerks, military policemen, Air Force mechanics, and naval-station functionaries. Thus the needs of the doughboy for a cross-country weapons carrier were all but forgotten. The new refinements that make it a heavier vehicle do not increase its carrying capacity and make it less able to perform its cross-country missions as well as rendering it less air-transportable.

Despite the discouraging attitude of certain automotive experts who seem to think a lighter vehicle is not needed or cannot be built, the Airborne Troop Board is experimenting with an 800-pound four-wheeled vehicle powered by a small but rugged engine. The machine will carry up to a thousand pounds on a simple flat-bed deck. In tests, the one model available—built experimentally during the last war by Willys-Overland—proved itself in sand and mud and on steep grades the equal



A light tank being loaded into a C-124 transport

if not the superior of the jeep in carrying normal infantry loads.

Artillery and Communications

The use of light metals in heavy artillery pieces would be a boon not only to the people seeking to make the Army air-transportable but also to the hard-working artillerymen who must manhandle their pieces into position in mud, snow, and sand. The weight of the 105-mm. howitzer has been reduced almost by half in certain experimental models. Perhaps the greatest reduction would not be in the weapons themselves but in the prime movers and trucks used to haul the heavier guns. Lighter weapons could make lighter vehicles possible. While there are about fifty-four 105-mm. and eighteen 155-mm. howitzers in the present infantry division, there are more than 1,000 jeeps, 370 $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton trucks, and 700 $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks. Light metals would appreciably decrease this vast tonnage.

In other fields real progress can be reported. The Signal Corps, for example, has reduced the weight and size of its new switchboard by about seventy per cent. It has developed a new type of field wire that weighs forty-eight pounds per mile as compared to 132 pounds for Second World War wire. Its new walkie-talkie is just half the size and weight of the older version, yet has four times as many frequency channels and twice the power.

A tractor has been developed that weighs half as much as the standard version of the same power. Lightweight attachments make it successively a bulldozer, front-loading shovel, grader, prime mover, and power source for a winch.

The impetus for gaining the mobility that air transportation promises came originally from the Army itself. For many months it operated the Army Airborne Center, directed by General Miley. Recently, however, the center became unified under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Air Force, which of course is vitally interested, agreed in principle with the aims of the Army, but until the Joint Board was created its support was less than what Army enthusiasts would describe as wholehearted.

There are perfectly understandable reasons for this attitude. The Air Force's strategic and tactical commands come first in its planning and



thinking. Indeed, the Military Air Transportation Service (MATS), which is the unified strategic long-distance aerial transportation service for all the services, rates higher priorities than the small, almost forgotten troop-carrier force, whose job is to transport Army airborne units and equipment. The Air Force became independent of the Army at the very time when the evolution of aircraft was making it possible for an army to increase its speed and striking power manyfold by using aircraft to carry troops and equipment into battle and to supply its needs during combat.

Air Force vs. Army

Noting this, some Army officers believe that the equivalent of the troop-carrier force—planes and men—should be returned to the Army. They sometimes complain that aircraft development and research in which the Army is interested is shunted aside for similar work in bomber and fighter planes. They also complain that the poorest pilots are assigned to troop-carrier squadrons and that the Air Force doesn't make enough planes available for Army use.

There are some justifications for these complaints, but they are not likely to be decisive. The Army has built up a group of officers who are competent in the field of aircraft development and able to talk the language that pushes projects through Air Force research and procurement offices. The field of light planes and helicopters is almost completely the Army's own. It trains its own pilots and owns the aircraft in which they fly. It may be that

experience will eventually dictate that the Army should also "own" the so-called assault transports and other planes that will work in close support of the ground fighters.

But it will not happen until experience and logic overwhelmingly dictate it. The Air Force, jealous of its hard-won independence, is inclined to harden its heart when outspoken and rabid critics of the Army attack it. The reverse is also true. But when fair-minded men get together—and there are many in both services—generous attempts at understanding solve the difficulties, which are obviously almost entirely psychological.

General Miley sees the evolution of the Army into an air-transportable force as primarily a job of education. It delights him that General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, hardly ever makes a speech without referring to the importance of air transportation of the Army. "We are in an air age," General Miley says, "and when [General Collins] speaks about mobility he means air mobility. . . . airborne operations provide the quickest means of enveloping the enemy and the most rapid means of massing our troops at a decisive point. The potential for airborne operations appears to be unlimited. By the development of better air transportation and lighter equipment, we should expand our capabilities for airborne operations to enable as much of our Army as possible to participate in airborne operations. . . . if we take action now, within [a few] years the logistical support for our entire Army will be by air, and ground lines of communication will be obsolete."

Essay on Battle-Axes

A treatise by a former combat correspondent who confesses—under duress—that he knows war better than he does women

AL NEWMAN

ON READING some weeks ago of the six WAC sergeants who waylaid and all but demolished a WAC private first class on a lonely road, my thoughts turned—unfairly, no doubt—to a speculation that occurred to many men during the Second World War. What would front-line warfare be like if women were the warriors?

The beating in point took place near Fort Breckinridge, Kentucky. According to the press reports, the victim had previously testified in a court-martial leading to the dishonorable discharge of a WAC corporal, a friend of the six sergeants. As to what the corporal was convicted of, the Army has maintained a gentlemanly reticence. In any case, the private spent twenty-five days in hospital recovering.

Such incidents are not unknown in the old-style, or male, Army. Usually, however, the ranks are reversed; a group of privates trap a hated sergeant on a dark night. More often the fist-cuffs are one against one, and seldom result in hospitalization. The WAC sergeants' rebuke of the private, in short, was not unprecedented, but it seemed unduly emphatic. However, when it comes to crimes of violence, such emphasis is more or less typical of the sex. As any district attorney will tell you, when a woman turns to murder she never uses one bullet where an entire clip of eight will do. After Jael, the Biblical heroine, put Israel's enemy Sisera to sleep, was she content to slip a knife between his ribs? Hardly. She drove a tent pin through his skull.

In history and, better still, mythology there are female soldiers. It is probably

just as well to skip the Amazons, though, for many authorities hold that they were not women at all, but men of peculiar habits. A small army of women warred on the Duke of Bohemia in the eighth century and enslaved or killed all the men they encountered. In the sixteenth century the Spanish explorer Orellana claimed he had discovered a tribe of warrior women along the South American river now known as the Amazon, but some Spanish explorers were picturesque liars.

Individually, we have Boadicea, a British queen who fought the Roman forces of Nero. (She had a certain amount of provocation; the Romans, in what might be termed an excess of colonialism, had seized her kingdom of Norfolk, scourged her, and violated her two daughters.) There were also Joan of Arc, Molly Pitcher, Hannah Snell, and Mary Anne Talbot. The last-named, an Englishwoman, started her career as a drummer boy in Flanders, and in its course served as cabin boy on a French ship and as powder monkey aboard the British *Brunswick*. Hannah Snell, another Englishwoman, seems to have been tracking down a wandering husband when, in 1745, she enlisted in a regiment of foot. Subsequently she deserted and shipped aboard the Royal Navy sloop *Swallow* for the East Indies, where she was wounded in action. Both ladies later wrote best-sellers.

In Utter Silence

Probably the best-authenticated instance of an all-female combat unit is to be found in the army of Dahomey,

West Africa, when it was still an independent kingdom. It is unknown how long ago the unit was formed, but Gezo, Dahomey's greatest king, is supposed to have reorganized and strengthened the female contingent shortly after his accession in 1818. He had a brilliant reign of forty years, during which his army, with the Amazons as its elite, won many victories. Gezo's successors got into various difficulties with the French, and in 1900, after a series of battles and treaties, the French took over the entire country. As to the general characteristics of the Amazon troops, we are informed that on maneuvers they used to charge through successive barriers of thorns barefoot, careless of pain. What may be more surprising to male readers is the fact that a favorite tactic was an approach march by upwards of a thousand women in *utter silence*.

Inhumanity to Woman

The ability of women to endure pain, to witness it, and even to inflict it is well documented. Various tribes of North American Indians customarily turned the wounded enemy over to their women to torture to death as slowly as possible. In civilized Britain during the Second World War, bobbies quite frequently were called upon to rescue shot-down crews of German daylight bombers from mobs of aroused housewives.

It will be objected, of course, that these are instances of woman's inhumanity to man. But the average female's tendency toward mistreatment of her own sex is pronounced. Ask any



shopgirl or waitress whether she would rather serve a man or a woman. Nurses in obstetrical wards often complain that they lead dreadful lives.

Girl of the Golden West

Practically all the citations thus far involve primitive peoples or journeys into the remote past. What do we know about the modern woman of the West?

She is brave, hardy, and self-sacrificing. The women of the various Air Raid Precaution services in London during the Second World War set an enviable standard of personal courage under bombardment, as did members of the ATS and WAAF involved in anti-aircraft work. U.S. Army nurses, particularly those who lived and worked in the tents of evacuation hospitals on cold, muddy fields close behind the fronts, were beyond praise. From the standpoint of performance, no less an authority than General Eisenhower has lauded the WACs attached as clerical workers to Allied Force Headquarters in the Mediterranean and SHAEF in

North Europe. Personal observation of women at or immediately behind the front in Europe led me to the conclusions that the courage of the sexes is about equal, and that the ability of women to withstand cold is markedly superior to that of men.

She is inclined to ignore "silly" rules. Any customs inspector or traffic policeman will support this contention. The general feminine defense is that the fractured ordinance or regulation "was enacted by men." It may be pointed out in this connection that the same feminine objection applies to the Geneva Convention embodying the rules of "civilized" warfare.

She is also inclined to be subjective. As one of the favored few who returned to the United States immediately after V-E Day, I was treated to an extraordinary demonstration of this. Much of Europe lay in ruins. Millions had died in concentration camps. Untold thousands of survivors, starved and sick, presented an urgent and tremendous relief problem. A brilliant military vic-

tory had been won. Yet the first—and usually the only—question several women asked me concerned none of these, nor whether the Germans could be weaned from the poisoned milk of Nazism by a severe but fair occupation policy (we were naive in those days), nor what the Russians were up to. It was: "Do you think Hitler is *really* dead?" Obviously, the American woman had simplified nearly six years of complex world-wide warfare into a blood feud between herself and Hitler.

Fashionably Late

For many years the monotonous feminist cry has been that if women ruled the world there would be no more wars. I suggest that nothing could be further from the truth, as the history of Britain under the reigns of Queens Elizabeth, Anne, and Victoria alone should demonstrate. It is this very subjectiveness, this tendency to take things personally, that would militate against peace among women in the seats of international power. A mutual personal dislike between she-Prime Ministers—and there would be plenty—could easily develop into a *casus belli*.

As to the original question—what front-line warfare would be like if women fought it—we may be guided by the general tendencies of the putative combat personnel, as the Army would put it. Such personnel would probably be capable of extreme physical violence when aroused; able to bear and inflict extraordinary amounts of pain; cruel to a degree toward enemies of the same sex; brave; and somewhat inclined, particularly in the heat of combat against a personally hated foe, to ignore the Geneva Convention.

With this material, what could result but the most savage shambles? Couple it with the results of a few feminine foibles I have failed to mention—the artillery support barrage arriving invariably late, but nobody knowing *how* late, and on the wrong co-ordinates because of a mistake in arithmetic; the bombardment of friendly towns due to errors in map reading; tanks running out of control through houses containing command posts or aid stations—and one would have a veritable *feuilleton*. It is easy to see that an all-female battle would eclipse the horrors of atomic war. If such a thing should come to pass, "Please," as Sam Goldwyn did *not* say, "include me out."

New Yorker Cartoons: The Last Quarter Century

J. K. GALBRAITH

THE NEW YORKER TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY ALBUM. Harper & Brothers. \$5.

ON THE jacket flap of this volume the publisher observes that it is "the finest collection of humorous drawings ever assembled," and also an "entertaining record" of the last quarter century. The first claim can readily be granted; the second, the one with which I am here concerned, also has merit, although it may not be entirely wise. The main job of the humorous artist is not to write history but to cheer people up. We all know what happens to lighthearted men who develop a Sense of Destiny. An elderly uncle tells me that Westbrook Pegler was a good sports writer in his day.

Moreover, no two people will ever agree on what an artist is trying to say, or when he is being relevant, deep, or subtle, and when he is merely being funny. In the present volume, for example, there is an engaging drawing by Richter in which a compassionate rabbit comforts its mate with the words "Of course, we could adopt some." A respected friend tells me this would not be in the slightest degree funny except for its sardonic meaning to an audience whose ancestors lived, loved, and bred like bunnies, and which must itself resort to the adoption agency or the baby black market if it is to rear one pampered brat per family. He may be right, but it is just possible that the artist thought there was something amusing about unfecund rabbits.

The Irresistible Temptation

The temptation, or obligation, to ascribe social significance becomes almost irresistible when one observes how consistently a few simple themes run through the artists' work. There is, for example, the unfailing popularity of

the desert island (which during the Second World War acquired palm trees and became an atoll). Does this mean that the artists, and by implication their audience, are frustrated by the complexities of their existence and are fascinated by a simple Crusoe economy improved by healthy outdoor sex? That may be reasonable, but how explain the number of drawings in

which unprecocious adults try to communicate, with ludicrous success, with precocious children? Or the equally large number showing precocious old men trying to communicate with mentally (though not physically) unprecocious young women? Or the legions of vagrant, drunken, or displaced Santa Clauses who have become more of a seasonal feature than



From *The New Yorker Twenty-fifth Anniversary Album*

"My parents taught me to fear God and respect my fellow-man. I was president of my class at college and was voted most likely to succeed. After graduation, I joined the staff of a large corporation and devoted all my energy to my work. I neither drank nor smoked nor let pleasure deflect me from my objective. As the years passed, my devotion was rewarded with increasing responsibilities until finally I was elected Chairman of the Board. I was given an honorary degree by Columbia, and the President of the United States bestowed on me the Medal of Merit for services in my country's behalf. At the height of my career, I was invited to pose for an advertisement featuring men of outstanding accomplishment. I accepted this honor. The photographer posed me before his camera and placed in my hand a glass of liquid. Out of curiosity, I took a sip—and then another sip—and another . . ."

Tiny Tim? Or the popularity of amiable, matter-of-fact, but rather dim-witted convicts? Perhaps the most puzzling of all, though I hadn't realized it before, is the preoccupation with the big stone faces on mountainsides. In the present volume there are three full-dress treatments of this inexhaustible theme, each by a different artist. Each of these things may mean *something*, but it has seemed to me wisest, in examining the present volume as social history, to stick to those drawings where the economic, political, or social comment is deliberate and obtrusive.


The Tentative Twenties

There is still a rewarding variety of such drawings in this volume, although they do not become especially interesting until the early 1930's. During the first five years of the *New Yorker*—those of Coolidge-Hoover prosperity—the artists apparently found little worth considering in contemporary political or economic life. In the two or three political cartoons from this period the reference to politics is tangential—the prototype is the small boy who sights a full-feathered Indian chief and cries: "Quick, mama—look! President Coolidge!"

The only comment on the frantic economics of the New Era is a Mary Petty drawing of a stock-market operator telephoning from the depths of an easy chair by a ticker: "No, I have to stay here and work. I'm unloading copper." During these years the artists were principally fascinated by teenage sex drives and by the funny behavior of social drunks. By the end of the 1940's, it is interesting to note, the white-tie alcoholic had disappeared entirely as a comic figure. Apparently he has become a man to be pitied, not laughed at. Such amusement as drunkenness now provides comes from the down-and-out soak who either moralizes in bars or gets heaved out of them. Presumably he has nothing to lose.

The Wry Thirties

In the 1930's, the artists discovered both economics and politics with a rush; from the standpoint of social satire, this was clearly their best period. They were devastating in their treatment of the irresponsible rich, and, increasingly as the decade wore along, of the more frenzied haters of Roosevelt.



From *The New Yorker Twenty-fifth Anniversary Album*

One artist, Reginald Marsh, abandoned all pretense to humor in two compelling drawings, one of an endless and endlessly dreary bread line winding up to an open window and the other of a child being held far above the heads of a mob while her atavistic mother explains, "This is her first lynching."

However, in few instances did the artists, or their late editor, forget that humor was their proper vehicle. Thus Alain has a rotund convict posting a sign for a Sunday ball game: TRUSTIES VS. WALL STREET; Peter Arno has one group of jolly aristocrats inviting another to go down to the Trans-Lux and hiss Roosevelt; in an intimate scene, one of Galbraith's most resplendent and simian plutocrats contributed the immortal courtship line: "And if Roosevelt is not reelected, perhaps even a villa in Newport, my dearest sweet." Roosevelt must have got more joy out of these drawings than anything else published in his time. Nor did his de-

tractors suffer except by accident; it can hardly be supposed that they saw them, being, as they were, mostly humorless men.

The Feeble Forties

The drawings of the 1940's had less bite. During the war years the artists dealt effectively with the banalities and not infrequent insanities of military life and especially with generals who were overinflated by their own importance and majors who were suffering from their total lack of importance. This was a necessary task but hardly a great one. The more commonplace theme of these years was the amatory techniques and ambitions of enlisted men, and this, after all, was fairly commonplace. The only wartime *tour de force* in the present collection is the famous "*Life* Goes to the Collapse of Western Civilization." While this was much applauded at the time, perhaps partly because any attack on *Life* is fashionable, it seems to me now, as it did then, to have missed the point. *Life*'s crime is not in treating great subjects frivolously; it is in inflating small issues by a false sense of drama, and taking its own thoughts somewhat too profoundly.

The last few years are better. A good proportion of the asinities of our domestic society get attention. Alan Dunn has a fine drawing on the sillier extremes of the witch hunt; Cobean must have caused some second thoughts on one of the more fatuous of recent advertising campaigns with his picture of a decrepit figure at a Salvation Army street-side revival confessing that a sip from the glass of Calvert, as he posed as a Man of Distinction, started him irrevocably on his downward path. Numerous similar subjects get attention.

Who Laughs?

Curiously, however, the artists had little to say during the 1940's about the preoccupying questions of war, dictatorships, and Communism. The drawings that feature Hitler are trivial; by far the most penetrating one on our current worry is a summer scene by Alan Dunn of idyllic relaxation in New England, captioned "Oh, dear, I'd really be enjoying this if it weren't for Russia." It is not, I think, that these matters were (or are) too serious to joke about; Charles Addams plays en-

thusiastically on fears of atomic obliteration. Rather, the subjects themselves were too remote from the experience of both artist and audience for effective satire. The humorous drawing as satire must be about, and is limited to, people and preoccupations that are close by.

This provides a clue to an interesting question concerning this form of social comment. It is: Who are the people who laugh at the political and economic prejudices that the *New Yorker* artists hold up to ridicule?

We can be clear about one thing, although the reverse has been argued. People do not laugh at themselves. Those who hated Roosevelt (and still do) are not amused by a satirical treatment of their fixation. No woman alive or dead ever looked at a Hokinson drawing and saw herself.

But neither could these drawings be interesting to people who had never met any Roosevelt haters or bulbous clubwomen. Those who were amused had to be very close, both economically and socially, to those at whom they laughed. Indeed, they had to be close enough to say: "There, but for the grace of a superior intelligence, a better figure, or a perceptive preference for the League of Women Voters, go I." The *New Yorker's* audience is in the wedge that the *New Yorker* itself has helped drive into the American middle class.

It is my conclusion, based on years of careful study, that most Americans who call themselves well-to-do take life very seriously. Success is not something to be viewed lightly: A man *earns* the right to a decent standard of living, meaning one somewhat higher than he now enjoys; certainly his wife *has* social obligations—the way they are discharged is important to any man with a career; this Administration (meaning the one that has been in office for nineteen of the *New Yorker's* twenty-six years) is no laughing matter—look at what it is doing to this country. There is some encouragement in the existence of a minority which can be amused. Nor, apparently, is it so small. The media buyers of J. Walter Thompson *et al.* apparently believe it large enough to sustain the advertising of Jean Patou, Countess Mara, and Black, Starr & Gorham, none of whom could possibly be described as a purveyor to the poor.

The Earth on Paper

THE AMERICAN OXFORD ATLAS. Edited by Brigadier Sir Clinton Lewis, O.B.E., and Colonel J. D. Campbell, D.S.O. *Oxford University Press, New York. \$10.*

THE STANDARD American atlas is undoubtedly in the glove compartment of the family car. It's a wonderful and profuse atlas, a powerful influence in domestic education. The road maps of the oil companies attune us not only to brand names of gasoline and oil but to a special and particular geography.

Increasingly we know our country by the road grid, and the relations of our towns and cities by the numbered highways weaving them together. However full and accurate this knowledge becomes with confirmed over-the-road drivers, it is unbalanced by its disregard of nearly all characteristics of the land except mathematical distance and the single represented feature of the landscape—the roads.

Salt Lake City is more, actually, than the point where Routes 40 and 50 separate for their lines going east; and St. Louis can bring other things to mind besides the crossing of 40 and 50 and 66. Still more of this bias makes us find a geometrical pattern—named, for example, Hawthorne Circle, created solely to separate Sawmill from Bronx River from Taconic Parkways—richer and fuller of interest than we do the city of Pittsburgh, which suffers from being merely a spot on a single really serious highway: No. 30 east-west. For all of us, our usual maps cover only the cities and states where we happen to go, and which we view while moving as rapidly as we can, on our own main routes.

The Cartographer's Task

Cartography, indeed, is a symbolical art, and it is appropriate that the larger the surface of the earth one tries to map out, the more distortion one has to accept in the result. And the scale of error increases proportionately as the map ranges away from the arbitrarily chosen central points or lines.

The problem of a world atlas is to overcome these problems of distortion

and to select for observation the most interesting elements that can be rendered with consistent and accurate order. The editors here briefly explain the actual geometry of map projections, and the individual pages include an identification of the form used for the areas before our eyes. Nevertheless, maps of the entire world are bound to be rather unsatisfactory because the scale is so small. The thirteen "distribution maps" in *The American Oxford Atlas* are handsome but hard really to see. The world population map, with a dot for 500,000 people, is the one of these providing easiest utility and attraction. The geologic maps, showing "elements of structure," are pleasing in their line and colors but relevant more for geologists than for laymen.

In the forty-seven regular maps of regions, countries, continents (the U.S.A. is given several larger references and then subdivided into six regions), the aspect of the page is generally dominated by the color "layering" which gives relief. The effect is good, and it gives the topographical background needed to make acquaintance with an area. The six inks in twelve tints are graduated according to altitude in a clever way which makes elevations seem to be molded by contour shading.

The printing and production of *The American Oxford Atlas* are extraordinary, and its price of \$10 almost deflationary for these cruel days. The place names are hand-lettered, and put on the maps in the clearest and most "natural" positions. The brief text sections are examples of beautiful typography. Each map is signed with the name of its draftsman-cartographer author, in recognition of the personal and artistic quality of the job.

An atlas encourages a reader to sit down and contemplate an area and attempt to realize a region in itself, as it were, and not as blank spaces separating spots we are driving to or from at an impatient speed. For this longer study, the gazetteer, or index of towns and topographical features, is a big part. The gazetteer in this atlas is 465



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The
Reporter

220 East 42nd Street, New York 17, N.Y.

columns long, and it covers an amazing amount. Countries are given special reference panels with a box of key information, statistics, and pronunciations (as a BBC announcer would give them). Characteristically, and gratefully, the index includes historical and archeological place names. An atlas is not just for today's news any more than just for today's trip.

Where THEY Live


Morbidly but almost inevitably, one soon turns to the maps of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the regional divisions thereof which show more details of the rival power. There is the tremendous and fearsome sweep of the Soviets, but there is also enormous variety and the representation of complexity and of immense human interest in shifts of natural environment and works of man, and there is a reflection of history in all the lines and letters and in every shade of color. The maps lead to a calmer regard of the object in itself and for its own sake.

"Russia-in-Europe"—on the scale of 1:10 million, with the twelve tints (and white) for elevation, and with roads and railways, towns and cities, hills and rivers, and a dozen other indications—is no drab and unitary blot. Along with the structure and rainfall charts, and the pages for population and vegetation, the series forces the mind and imagination toward a kind of realism and a fuller appreciation of the problem of the human race living with the Soviets, poised there in their twin-continental Union. And we are led further to consider the area of the earth itself, shaped and contoured and drained as it is, and occupied by people with these languages and cities and towns, and with those highways and railways and the boundaries and capitals and landscapes and that weather.

A good atlas like this one asserts the earth, with the natural and the constructed character which ages of geology and of history have given it. Here is the inevitable physical framework of creative thought and imagination and action. Without repeated and intensive regard for this, our ideas and emotions lose body, and so the strength and the sympathy needed for living anywhere on the revolving globe.

—PHILIP BURNHAM

World population map from
The American Oxford Atlas →



Medal of Honor



Lieutenant Frederick Henry of Clinton, Oklahoma—Medal of Honor for sacrificing himself to save his platoon in combat near Am-Dong, Korea, September 1, 1950. When the platoon could no longer hold its position, Lieutenant Henry ordered the men to pull back. But someone had to stay behind to provide covering fire. He chose to be that man, and was lost.

Always remember this—Lieutenant Henry offered his life for more than just a small platoon in far-away Korea. It was also for America. For you.

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